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Bringing America Back to the Future:Reclaiming a Principle of
Honesty in Property and IP Law
Joshua J. Schroeder*
“If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking
power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively
possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone. . . . He
who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine,
receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and
mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition,
seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by
nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all
space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the
air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being,
1
incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.”
“ [The] truth is great and will prevail if left to herself, that she
is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing
to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition
disarmed of her natural weapons free argument and debate
errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to
2
contradict them.”
— Thomas Jefferson, Founder, United States of America

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF INTANGIBLE
*

Joshua J. Schroeder, holds a J.D. from Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland,
Oregon. Thank you to Professor Jeffrey Jones for his wisdom, input and support
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1
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1291 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed. 1984).
2
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 347 (This bill was enacted by the Virginia General
Assembly with the support of James Madison. It vindicates religious and
intellectual freedom and was one of the sources that Congress drew upon when
drafting the Bill of Rights in 1789).
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PROPERTY
It has been five years since the global market sunk into a
“great recession”3 and thus far there has been a serious lack of
reevaluation. The “tea party” libertarians and the “occupy
movement” liberals don’t seem to carry us much further than the
ruminations of F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ayn Rand on the economy.4
Meanwhile, the deep division between the public interest and
private property ownership has been rushed to extremes. For
example, the Tenth Circuit has allowed local government officials
to sell the freedom of speech in Salt Lake City’s town to the private
corporate ownership of a religious institution.5 Of course the project
of defining the scope of public property, public goods, and the
public interest under the First Amendment has always been at a
constant tension with private property ownership.6 However, as it
3

DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE GREAT DEFORMATION: THE CORRUPTION OF
CAPITALISM IN AMERICA 3–5 (1st ed. 2013) (Stockman called the approval of the
TARP bill bail out the "triumph of crony capitalism."). See generally, Mark
Szeltner et al, Diminished Lives and Futures: A Portrait of America in the GreatRecession Era, RUTGERS: WORK TRENDS (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/content/Work_Trends_Februar
y_2013.pdf.
4
Compare F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 110 (The Scribner ed.
1925) ("Can't repeat the past? . . . Why of course you can!"), with AYN RAND,
ATLAS SHRUGGED 577 (First Plume Printing ed. 1957) ("[Robin Hood] is
remembered not as a champion of property, but as a champion of need, not as a
defender of the robbed, but as a provider to the poor. . . . He is the man who
became the symbol of need, not achievement, is the source of rights, that we don't
have to produce, only to want, that the earned doesn't belong to us, but the
unearned does.").
5
Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir.
2005) (signs informing the public that the town square was no longer "public"
along with the Mormon Church's purchase of the property including the public's
easement to traverse the town square ousted the public's free speech rights in Salt
Lake City's main street plaza including the ability for homosexuals to show
affection while on the plaza grounds).
6
Letter From John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, in 9 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 375–78 (C. Adams, Ed., 1854) ("Such is the frailty of the human
heart, that very few men who have no property, have any judgment of their own.
They talk and vote as they are directed by some man of property, who has
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was intended by the framers,7 this tension was not meant to protect
the “human interposition” of dishonest creation, allocation and
valuation of intangible property that is commonplace in the market
today.8 After all, it was in the framer’s plan to waylay the dangers
of “error” by guaranteeing the public’s freedom to contradict them
with truth.9 Thus, as intangible property is used to cloak error as
truth,10 thereby disarming the truth of “her natural weapons [of] free

attached their minds to his interest. . . . [P]ower always follows property. . . .
[T]he balance of power in a society, accompanies the balance of property in land.
The only possible way, then of preserving the balance of power on the side of
equal liberty and public virtue, is to make the acquisition of land easy to every
member of society.") (italics added).
7
Id.
8
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, enacted on
January 16, 1786, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 347 (This bill was
enacted by the Virginia General Assembly with the support of James Madison. It
vindicates religious and intellectual freedom and was one of the sources that
Congress drew upon when drafting the Bill of Rights in 1789).
9
Id.
10
Thomas Lee Hazen, Volatility and Market Inefficiency: A Commentary on the
Effects of Options, Futures, and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market, 44 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 789, 795 (1987) (noting that options and futures trading can be
"manipulative and artificial"). C.f. John Letzing, Google Says Patents, Tech Were
Less Than Half of Motorola's Price, THE WALL ST. J., July 24, 2012,
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/07/24/google-says-patents-tech-were-less-thanhalf-motorolas-price/ ("Google said . . . that $2.9 billion of the purchase price for
Motorola was attributable to cash acquired, $2.6 billion was related to goodwill,
$730 million for customer relationships and $670 million for 'other net assets
acquired.'" Google characterized consumer relationships with Motorola and what
consumers thought about Motorola as worth billions of dollars when consumer's
themselves may own their relationships and thoughts); Jon Leibowitz, F.T.C.
Chairman, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the Sixth Annual Georgetown
Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Sept. 19, 2012, WL 4339298 at 3 (Noting a major circuit split over pay-for-delay
contracts regarding whether they violate antitrust law between the Third and the
Second, Eleventh and Federal Circuits: "Eliminating pay-for-delay deals would
save American consumers $3.5 billion annually and, because the federal
government accounts for roughly one-third of the nation's prescription drug
spending, it would lower the federal budget deficit by $5 billion over ten years.").
See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) ("First, we take
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argument and debate,”11 the Courts must hold intangible property
claims to a minimum standard of honesty as a formality.12
Intangible property springs from the positivist view that
anything from which value can be derived is “property.”13 Thus,
intangibles can be defined as any property that is not physical or
tangible. Intangibles may include the field of law known as
Intellectual Property (IP), but so far is not limited by it. Stocks,
futures, mortgages, securities, insurance and other creative business
tools can be included in the category of “intangible property.” Since
intangible property is not necessarily connected to real, tangible
property it is notoriously dubious to valuate.14 In fact, market-wide
issue with the scope of the patent test's almost un-rebuttable presumption of
patent validity."). See also C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlement As A Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553,
1616 (2006) (Noting that self-help measures like pay-for-delay contracts disrupt
the balance struck by patent regulation between innovation and competition).
11
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, enacted on
January 16, 1786, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 347.
12
J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, 320 (2d ed.
1979) (noting that even the claims of innocent owners gave way to "honest sales
which took place in a market or fair."). See also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *448–49 (commenting on market overt, that honesty was so
important to England's Saxon ancestors in the transfer of title that sales and
bargains of chattels had to be "contracted in the presence of credible witnesses.").
13
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 19 (1913) (hereinafter Hohfeld I). See
generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 712–13 (1917) (hereinafter
Hohfeld II). See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth
Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV.
325, 357 (1980).
14
Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 2324, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416),
2013 WL 836946 (One of the arguments made to the Supreme Court for not
limiting pay-for-delay agreements regarding drug patents included the difficulty
of valuating the agreements due to the central nature of intangibles to them:
"There is typically significant ambiguity around the value of such agreements
because they often include the purchase of intellectual property, real options
(through joint ventures), supply agreements, risk sharing, and the settlement of
other litigation. Determining the value of such one-of-a-kind business agreements
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problems with the creation, allocation and valuation of intangible
property resulted in perpetual cycles of market failure.15
Seemingly undaunted by global market crisis, intangible
property owners have pushed their property claims beyond
precedent.16 In fact, some have voiced their desire for unlimited and
absolute rights to intangibles.17 Perhaps the most telling example is
can be very difficult."); Hazen, supra note 10, at 795; Ben Hirschler, UK
Watchdog Accuses GSK Over "Pay-For-Delay" Drug Deals, REUTERS, April 19,
2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/19/us-glaxosmithklineantitrustidUSBRE93I07720130419.
15
STOCKMAN, supra note 3, at 3–5, 361–63, 501–07 (Drawing a correlation
between market failures due to widespread opportunism and overvaluation of
intangible property in America).
16
Compare Milton Friedman, The Need for Futures Markets in Currencies, 31
CATO J. 635, 636 (Fall 2011) http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/
cato-journal/2011/9/cj31n3-15.pdf (advocating for a need for a futures market in
the 1970's when America's currency was "floated" and no longer backed by a
promise of gold value in exchange.), with 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *398 ("By the rules of the ancient common law, there could be
no future property, to take place in expectancy, created in personal goods and
chattels."), and Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2590
(2012) ("The proposition that Congress may dictate the conduct of an individual
today because of prophesied future activity finds no support in our precedent. We
have said that Congress can anticipate the effects on commerce of an economic
activity. . . . But we have never permitted Congress to anticipate that activity
itself in order to regulate individuals not currently engaged in commerce.").
17
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 517–18 (2003) (explaining how maximized copyright
protection could be drafted in federal statute to avoid unconstitutionality);
Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical
Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 482, 520
(2010) (Proposing a "carryover hypothesis" involving the determination of "how
few deviations from the traditional views of property intangibles need to be made
in order to develop a sensible system form copyright and patents."); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
108, 112, 118 (1990) ("Old rhetoric about IP equating to monopoly seemed to
have vanished, replaced by a recognition that a right to exclude IP is no different
in principle from the right to exclude in physical property. . . . Except in the rarest
case we should treat intellectual and physical property identically in the law which is where the broader currents are taking us."). See also Geoffrey Neri,
Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms? Unauthorized Music Downloading and
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the rise of an unprecedented coalition between powerful American
content owners and internet service providers called the Center for
Copyright Information.18 This organization was established with the
purpose of enforcing self-help measures to eradicate uses of online
content by the public in the wake of public outcry against the Stop
Online Piracy Act (SOPA), Protect IP Act (PIPA) and the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the resulting
government rejection of SOPA, PIPA and ACTA.19 According to

Unsettled Social Norms, 93 GEO. L.J. 733 (Noting a movement towards the view
that unauthorized internet downloading is theft "plain and simple.") (quoting
Press Release, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., Motion Picture and Music
Industries File Suit Against Scour.com (July 20, 2000), available at
http://www.mpaa.org/Press/ScourPressRelease.htm); Eric H. Holder, Jr.,
Remarks at the Press Conference Announcing the Intellectual Property Rights
Initiative (July 23, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/dagipini.htm; Dowling v. United States, 43 U.S. 207, 217 (1985).
18
About the Center for Copyright Information, (last visited March 25, 2013),
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/about-cci/ (CCI is a coalition of major
copyright owner interest groups and ISPs, and they are initiating copyright alert
systems in violation of net neutrality). See also John Tarnoff, We Don't Need Six
Strikes, HUFFINGTON POST, March 7, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johntarnoff/we-dont-need-six-strikes_b_2831489.html; Ernesto, MPAA: BitTorrent is
the Best Way to Pirate Movies and TV-Shows, TORRENTFREAK, March 23, 2013,
http://torrentfreak.com/mpaa-bittorrent-is-the-best-way-to-pirate-movies-and-tvshows-130323/ ("The MPAA, RIAA and the Internet providers participating in
the "six strikes" anti-piracy scheme have informed the Congressional Internet
Caucus Advisory Committee about their plans."); Kneecapping the Future:
Comcast’s Unjustified Internet Caps and the Plan to Kill Video Competition,
FREE PRESS, June 25, 2012, http://www.savetheinternet.com/sites/default/files/
resources/Comcast%20New%20Caps%20 Factsheet_FINAL.pdf (reporting that
Comcast has a cap on the data an internet subscriber can download through
Comcast, but exempted its video provider Xfinity); The Facts About AT&T’s
Facetime Blocking, FREE PRESS (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.savetheinternet.
com/sites/default/files/att-factsheet-fp.pdf.
19
See Larry Magid, What Are SOPA and PIPA And Why All the Fuss?, FORBES
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2012/01/18/what-aresopa-and-pipa-and-why-all-the-fuss/ (noting that the laws pit the tech industry
against the entertainment industry); Erik Kain, Final Draft of ACTA Watered
Down, TPP Still Dangerous on IP Rules, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2012/01/28/final-draft-of-acta-watered-
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the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) net neutrality
rules and the First Amendment, these self-help measures are
illegal.20 The major content owners’ zeal comes from an overblown
concept of property alone. Not unlike the fate of property claims in
the African American slaves of 1865,21 the People may eventually
recognize some of the property claims of the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) as baseless, destructive and
immoral.22
Granting absolute claims to intangible property would also
put unbearable pressure on the U.S. Constitution that was written in
the time of Blackstone—when property was necessarily physical.23
down-tpp-still-dangerous-on-ip-rules/ (noting that ACTA would force the DMCA
on developing nations and is a dangerous law to pass); David Meyer, ACTA
Rejected by Europe, Leaving The Treaty Near Dead, ZDNET (July 4, 2012),
http://www.zdnet.com/acta-rejected-by-europe-leaving-copyright-treaty-neardead-7000000255/ (noting that massive protests in Europe prompted the
European parliament to reject the treaty).
20
Preserving the Open Internet, 47 C.F.R. § 8 (2011); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (The Thirteenth Amendment abolished property
rights in people in 1865. This is a perfect example of how human rights can win
out over property rights).
22
Compare Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2005) ("Courts and commentators . . . make a
subconscious move, one that the economic theory of property does not justify:
they jump from the idea that intellectual property is property to the idea that the
IP owner is entitled to capture the full social value of her right."), with Hillary
Clinton, then acting U.S. Secretary of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, at 20,
THE U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, (June 2012) available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/192587.pdf (noting that many corporate supply chains
have been found to have been tainted with slavery, also noting that an estimated
20.9 million modern slaves exist today and that it constitutes an estimated $20
billion dollar industry globally). See also President Barak Obama, Fact Sheet: the
Obama Administration Announces Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking at
Home and Abroad, THE WHITE HOUSE, Sept. 25, 2012 (The President said that
modern slavery should "concern every business, because it distorts markets.").
23
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *316–17, *396–97 (Noting that
there is a difference between grant and livery to account for the incorporeal
aspects of estates. "Grants, concessiones; the regular method by the common law
of transferring the property of incorporeal hereditaments, or such things whereof
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In fact, a strict positivist approach to property would characterize a
right to free speech as intangible property. Such a
mischaracterization trivializes violations of the First Amendment.24
A property right in free speech would make it seem like the
marketplace-of-ideas in itself is a monetizable commodity.25 If the
no livery can be had. For which reason all corporeal hereditaments, as lands and
houses, are said to lie in livery; and the others, as advowsons, commons, rents,
reversions, etc., to lie in grant." Also noting that other than physical property "in
things personal" held in absolute possession, there were natural goods like light
and water that could only held in a qualified (i.e. less than absolute) possession.
Finally, Blackstone recognized "property in action" which "depends entirely upon
contracts." Thus, property was once parsed into categories and absolute rights
were only granted to physical property held in absolute possession). See
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 333 ("The courts of Blackstone's era claimed to be
protecting the possession of things." As such, incorporeal rights were only
granted in limitation and depended on contract law until it "had been reified, and
the resulting thing was owned absolutely.").
24
See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 881
(2003) (holding that "[t]he First Amendment does not prohibit courts from
incidentally enjoining speech in order to protect a legitimate property right.")
(citing San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 537–40 (1987) (a trademark case that enjoined the use of the word
"Olympic" in advertising without permission from the Olympic Committee)).
25
Compare Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1256
(10th Cir. 2005) (finding that Salt Lake City's sale of its Main Street Plaza,
including public use easement, to the LDS church for a total of $13.375 million
to manage it as an "ecclesiastical park" constituted a relinquishment of any first
amendment free speech rights in the town square. Thus, private ownership in a
traditionally public forum ousted public rights to free speech), with Paul
Barbagallo, Verizon First Amendment Challenge of Net Neutrality Tests Century
of Regulation, BLOOMBERG BNA, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.bna.com/verizonfirst-amendment-n17179872014/ (noting that Verizon's recent challenge seeks to
destroy any First Amendment justification for FCC prophylactic regulation to
protect free speech over the internet because internet networks are privately
owned and operated by corporations). See also Nicole Radzievich, Law Professor
Takes Issue with Free-Speech Restrictions at Steel Stacks, LEHIGH VALLEY'S
NEWSPAPER: THE MORNING CALL, Oct. 11, 2012, http://articles.mcall.com/201210-11/news/mc-bethlehem-steelstacks-free-speech-20121011_1_seth-moglenrestrictions-aim-steelstacks (noting that local governments and organizations are
cleverly drafting free speech restrictions in under the guise of private property, in
deed restrictions regarding public forums – Unclear wording/sentence structure;
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rights guaranteed in the Constitution are propertized and valuated,
some may begin to believe that rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not only be purchased, but also placed in the
“despotic dominion” of a private owner.26 This is exactly the hope
of those who would maximize copyright and patent rights beyond
the express limits to the Copyright and Patent Clauses.27
Before the strong upswing of positivist thought took hold in
the early twentieth century,28 property in a legal sense was bound to
be physical and absolute.29 In other words, the protection of
intangibles was perceived as mere covenant or promise unless or
until it resulted in a legal claim to actual physical property.30 As all
property presumably had something physical backing up the
property claim, it was easy to require due diligence on the part of
the buyer and seller to value the property correctly before a
property sale.31 However, buyer’s remorse is not so easily applied
do you mean to say: “in deed restrictions regarding public forums, local
governments and organizations are cleverly drafting free speech restrictions
under the guise of private property.” ).
26
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
27
Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 517–18. But see Dowling v. U.S., 473
U.S. 207, 216–17 (1985) (reasoning that a copyright is "no ordinary chattel.");
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 540 (1985)
(noting that "[t]he First Amendment's protections [are] embodied in the
[Copyright] Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and
uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment
traditionally afforded by fair use."); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No.
11–697, slip op. at 19, 31 (2013) (noting the objective of copyright in the
constitution is "Progress in Science and useful Arts," as well as noting that “the
Constitution describtes the nature of American copyright law[as] providing
Congress with the power to 'secur[e]' to '[a]uthors' 'for limited [t]imes' the
'exclusive [r]ight to their . . . [w]ritings.'") (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
28
Hohfeld I, supra note 13, at 19 (noting that all valuable interests can be
conceptualized as property). See generally Hohfeld II, supra note 13, at 712–13
(1917). See Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 357.
29
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *316–17, *396–97. See
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 333–35.
30
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *316–17, *396–97.
31
Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 577, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (1887) (deciding
that, where the buyer of a cow believes the cow to be a breading cow, and finds,
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in cases of intangible property for the simple reason that there is
nothing physically there to inspect. Thus scholars suggest that
intangible property rights should be inherently limited.32 However,
intangible property owners do not seem to share this idea.
Unheeded by most, the dangers ahead continue to mount as
intangible assets continue their dauntless course toward
maximization as an absolute form of property. Companies
worldwide have been mindlessly criticized for not claiming
hundreds of billions of dollars of intangible value including
unclaimed marketplace goodwill.33 In fact, overvalued intangible
property has proven to have a serious detrimental effect on pension
funds, retirement and the stock market.34 Shareholders continue to
after the fact, that the cow is barren, the buyer does not have a contract remedy
when the buyer could have inspected the cow beforehand. The court reasoned
that "the mistake was not of the mere quality of the animal, but went to the very
nature of the thing. A barren cow is substantially a different creature than a
breeding one."). See also Wood v. Boynton, 64 Wis. 265, 25 N.W. 42, 44 (1885)
(deciding that a person who sold a diamond for a dollar, because she was ignorant
of the "nature and value" of the stone, did not have a contract remedy for making
a bad bargain. "If she chose to sell it without further investigation as to its
intrinsic value to a person who was guilty of no fraud or unfairness which
induced her to sell it for a small sum, she cannot repudiate the sale because it is
afterwards ascertained that she made a bad bargain."); John Patrick Hunt, Taking
Bubbles Seriously in Contract Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 693 (2011).
32
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 357–58 ("This new property had been
dephysicalized and thus consisted not of rights over things, but of any valuable
right. The new property had also been limited. It consisted not of an absolute or
fixed constellation of rights, but of a set of rights which are limited according to
the situation.").
33
Tim Boreham, IP assets a closed book for most companies, THE AUSTRALIAN,
April 5, 2013, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/ business/opinion/ip-assets-aclosed-book-for-most-companies/story-e6frg9lo-1226612839028 (noting that, in
a disagreement regarding the going value of international businesses, a possible
value of $850 billion, $250 billion pertained to the value of unrecorded IP assets
a possible $850 billion valuation disagreement regarding going value of
international businesses, $250 billion of which pertained to the value of
unrecorded IP assets, like brand recognition).
34
James B. Stewart, Bad Directors and Why They Aren't Thrown Out, N. Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/business/why-baddirectors-arent-thrown-out.html?_r=0 (noting that HP’s purchase of Autonomy, a
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have very little recourse when public businesses write off bad
acquisitions of intangibles worth billions.35 The problem has
infected our government to the highest levels. For instance, in 2011,
the U.S. treasury’s valuation of the U.S. varied by $2 trillion from
Standard and Poor’s valuation.36 Furthermore, estimates of the daily
U.S. hedging activity including futures and option contracts is
around $4 trillion. In contrast, the underlying daily trade of physical
merchandise is only $40 billion.37 This constitutes a 100:1 ratio of
the trade of intangibles in the form of options and futures to the
underlying physical property value being traded. Furthermore,
when contracts involving intangibles are ripe for judicial review,
judges are told to look the other way.38 Lawmakers should not listen
to such requests because intangibles have played a central role in
the generation of massive deadweight losses that have been
shamelessly foisted onto the U.S. government and the middle class.

British software maker, for $11.1 billion, was "the worst corporate acquisition" in
history, even though HP later attributed $8.8 billion of that price to fraud; being
HP's purchase of Autonomy, a British software maker, for $11.1 billion. HP later
wrote off $8.8 billion of that price, claiming that it had been defrauded—also
noting that HP's failure had a detrimental effect on New York City's pension
fund.).
35
See, e.g., Amy Thompson, Microsoft Drops After Goldman Says PC Market
Share Will Falter, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, April 11, 2013, http://www.
sfgate.com/business/bloomberg/article/Microsoft-Drops-After-Goldman-SaysPC-Market-4427371.php (noting a possible overvaluation of Microsoft Window's
8 software IP).
36
Ian Katz &Vinny Del Giudice, S&P's Analysis was Flawed by $2 Trillion
Error, Treasury Says, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 5, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-08-06/s-p-s-analysis-was-flawed-by-2-trillion-error-treasurysays.html (when the going value of businesses and countries are given the color
of property, future projections of value become fixed in the present as if they are
real and as such projections can vary wildly.).
37
STOCKMAN, supra note 3, at 289 (an estimated $3.96 trillion dollar gap
between future and actual tangible property is traded every day).
38
Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 2324, Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12416), 2013 WL 836946; Friedman, supra note 16, at 636; Hirschler, supra note
14.
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This article puts forth one central argument: The hyperbroad concept of property used to justify absolutist claims to
intangible property is unconstitutional. This article demonstrates
how a principle of honesty enforced by the Court can keep
intangible property claims within the bounds of the constitution.
Furthermore, a principle of honesty can be used to protect property
common law from the political fallout driven by the highly
contentious valuations of intangibles that have escalated to
differences in valuation within the trillions of dollars. Finally,
enforcing honesty in the courts will enable the lower and middle
classes to continue to better themselves by participating in the
marketplace.
To arrive at a principle of honesty, this article discusses the
role of intangible property in constitutional interpretation. In Part I
it analyzes the recent Sebelius and Kirtsaeng decisions, arguing that
a reevaluation of Constitutional interpretation is currently
underway. Then, in Part II this article lays out the current concept
of property discourse (centered on a Liberal/Libertarian debate) and
its role in spurring America on a course toward worldwide
intangible property maximization. Finally, in Part III this article
will propose that the Court reclaim a standard of honesty in the
context of property rights analysis as a minimum formality
requirement. The marketplace allowance of shameless dishonesty in
the creation, marketing and valuation of intangible property as if it
is physical or tangible has exacerbated and accelerated market
failure to a global crescendo in 2008. Thus, all lawmakers should
take a clearer stance against this type of dishonesty in the future.
PART I: THE ROLE OF PROPERTY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
According to the Commerce Clause, Congress can regulate
“things” in interstate commerce.39 These “things” Congress can
regulate are informed by claims to property in a broadening class of
items. For example, Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence in Sebelius
sought to assert a strong property right in medical licenses against
39

U.S. CONST. art.I, § 8, cl. 3.
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any poor, lower class citizen who would not have been able to
afford the costs of necessary medical services. The federal
government, according to Justice Ginsberg, should be accorded the
authority to coerce lower class, impoverished Americans to
purchase insurance to ensure that doctors always get paid. With this
cart before the horse view, poor people that depend on free medical
services from licensed professionals are seen as trespassers. This
section will consider the new Sebelius decision regarding the
function of the Article I Constitutional grants of legislative power,
and its possible effect on past decisions. Finally it will discuss the
Kirtsaeng decision that interpreted common law property rights as a
limitation on copyright protection.
The Sebelius Decision
With its recent decision regarding the Affordable Care Act,
known popularly as Obamacare, the Supreme Court reached
perhaps its most pivotal Constitutional law decision since Brown v.
Board of Education.40 Three concurrences carried the day,41 without
a clear majority opinion on exactly how the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses interact with other Article I grants of
legislative power. However, one majority found that the Commerce
Clause could not be used to enact a penalty-tax and mandate for
Americans to buy health insurance.42 A second majority held that
nevertheless, the tax clause could justify the penalty-tax and
mandate even without Commerce Clause support.43 Only Chief
Justice Roberts found that both of these propositions may legally
40

Compare Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), with
Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 492
(1954) supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S.
294 (1955).
41
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2566, 2609, 2642 (Ginsberg, J. concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (Kennedy, J.
dissenting).
42
Id. (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito).
43
Id. (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kagan, Ginsberg and
Sotomayor).
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coexist.44 None of the Justices considered the practical effect of
their decision as a work around for the Constitutional limit that all
Federal taxes be “uniform.”45
None of the Justices intended to underwrite a workaround
for limits on the legislative grants of power in Article I in general.
However, Chief Justice Roberts (with the support of the Ginsberg
concurrence for purposes of the remedy) put forward a hands-off
approach that may indicate that he would allow de facto
workarounds.46 Because the Chief Justice also found that states
cannot be coerced to expand Medicaid, only the states opting in
would be subject to the penalty-tax. The practical result is a nonuniform federal tax that only Chief Justice Roberts held up as
constitutional.
This penalty-tax is no ordinary tax or penalty.47 In order to
avoid being struck under the Anti-Injunction Act,48 the Chief
Justice decided that it was actually a penalty for purposes of the
statute.49 On the other hand, he decided that the penalty was a tax
for the purpose of constitutionality under the Tax Clause.50
However, every Justice other than the Chief Justice agreed that this
sort of two-sided finagling was either not needed or not justified.51
44

Id.
Id.
46
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 ("the Court does not express any opinion on the
wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution, that judgment is
reserved for the people.").
47
Id. at 2566 (finding a penalty payable to the IRS.).
48
Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2013) (baring suits to "restrain the
assessment or collection of any tax.").
49
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2584 ("The Affordable Care Act does not require that
the penalty for failing to comply with the individual mandate be treated as a tax
for proposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.").
50
Id. at 2600 ("The Affordable Care Act's requirement that certain individuals
pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be
characterized as a tax. Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our
role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.").
51
Id. at 2609 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) ("The Chief Justice's crabbed reading of the
Commerce Clause harks back to the era in which the Court routinely thwarted
45
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The Ginsberg concurrence noted that judicial treatment of the
Commerce Clause should continue to justify tax-like laws like
this.52 The Kennedy dissent decided that the Affordable Care Act
should be overturned because the Commerce Clause should not
justify the law as enacted, and because the individual mandate
cannot be a penalty for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act and a
tax for purposes of the Tax Clause.53 Justice Thomas especially
made clear in his own concurring dissent that the substantial effects
test itself should be wholly removed.54
A majority of the court centered their opinions on a
determination of the scope of the Commerce Clause. Furthermore,
the de facto majority did not attempt to give a workable definition
of interstate commerce other than the one already existing. Thus,
Chief Justice Roberts’ interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause as a limit on the Commerce Clause carried the day, but
should not control future Constitutional interpretation. This reading
of the Necessary and Proper Clause should still be seen as a
minority view.55 However, the view that the Commerce Clause is
Congress' efforts to regulate the national economy in the interest of those who
labor to sustain it." Essentially, the tax for one purpose and penalty for another is
merely dicta in Ginsberg's dissent because the Commerce Clause is already
sufficient to justify the Affordable Care Act making the legitimacy of Congress'
tax power to support the individual mandate an "auxiliary holding." She did not
discuss the Anti-Injunction Act.); Id. at 2647 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("As we
said at the outset, whereas the precise scope of the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause is uncertain, the proposition that the Federal
Government cannot do everything is a fundamental precept.").
52
Id. at 2609 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Chief Justice's reading of the
Commerce Clause "should not have staying power.").
53
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2656 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("What the Government
would have us believe in these cases is that the very same textual indications that
show this is not a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act show that it is a tax under the
Constitution. That carries verbal wizardry too far, deep into the forbidden land of
the sophists.").
54
Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (Past Supreme Court decisions about the Necessary &
Proper Clause stretching back to McCulloch v. Maryland allowed Congress the
necessary regulatory power to institute effective regulation and remains
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somehow more limited than it had been is a majority view over
Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence.56
Thus, the Sebelius decision seems to announce that our
constitutional interpretation has shifted, and that the Commerce
Clause is now more limited than it was in the past.57 In response to
Chief Justice Roberts’ concern that constitutional provisions are
being rendered “superfluous” this article will turn to IP law. Past IP
case law that had relied on an expansive reading of the Commerce
Clause provides a useful lens to propose an agreeable limit on
Commerce Clause application going forward. The Article I grants
of power must coexist, including the limits to each grant of power.
To this end, by adopting reasonable limits to Congress’s Commerce
Power informed by the First Amendment and the Copyright and
Patent Clauses, the Court may also protect property law itself from
being commandeered by interests in intangible property.58 The
result would be a rationalized constitutional interpretation that
functions independently from the economic interests of those who

controlling); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324, 421 (1819) ("Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."). See
also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
6–19 (1957) (deciding that though the Necessary and Proper Clause may increase
the scope of regulatory power granted to Congress, Congress may not invoke the
Necessary and Proper Clause merely to comply with a treaty that would
otherwise override an express prohibition in the Constitution).
56
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsberg, J. concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (Justice Ginsberg's constitutional
interpretation included herself and Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. This
is a four Justice minority interpretation.).
57
Id. at 2586 (The Chief Justice seems to have limited his constitutional
interpretation in such a way as to give every provision effect: "If the power to
'regulate' something included the power to create it, many of the provisions in the
Constitution would be superfluous.").
58
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11–697, slip op. (2013) (using
property common law rights in physical property that may contain copyrighted
works to limit ambiguous portions of the copyright act).
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engage in dishonest practices in the creation, valuation and
allocation of intangibles.
In fact, an unbridled conception of intangible property rights
undertook a subtle but powerful role underlying the Sebelius
decision. In Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence, she noted that the
legislature enacted the changes to the Medicaid program as a
solution to a “free-riding problem.”59 Ginsberg implicitly validated,
and no other Justice challenged, that there actually is a free-riding
problem in the American health system. The idea that the existence
of poverty itself creates free-riders, and that being a sick, poor
person in need of medical help makes a person by their very nature
a trespasser is an abominable notion. The concept of property itself,
first adopted to ensure the equality of class,60 becomes an
oxymoron when it is used to label the weakest and poorest among
us as trespassers by their very nature of being impoverished and in
need of care.
This characterization is an absolutist claim to intangible
property at work. Medical licenses, the intangibles in play here, are
not supposed to carry with them a property assurance that all
services performed by medical professionals will be paid for. It is
good and right in any society of mortals, that doctors and hospitals
59

Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2623 (Ginsberg, J. concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Cf. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1043
n.48–54 (giving a number of examples of how IP courts are preoccupied with
uprooting free riders); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 167 (1992) ("A
culture could not exist if all free riding were prohibited within it."); PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 2 THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
818 (Aspen Law & Business ed., 2002) ("Our initial examples of free riding on
another's innovation or property beautification indicate that free riding is both
widespread and socially tolerated unless society enacts special legislation to
control it, such as the patent laws.").
60
Letter From John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, in 9 THE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 6, at 375–78 (arguing that in order to promote "equal
liberty," voting and property rights should be given to women). See also Thomas
C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY NOMOS XXII 69 (New
York Univ. Press 1980) ("property conceived as the control of a piece of the
material world by a single individual meant freedom and equality of status.").
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would be expected to write off some of their practices to help “the
least of these.”61 These costs should never be and should never have
been characterized as free-riding on a type of property. A standard
of honesty is a practicable way for the Judiciary to adjudicate these
types of property claims, as they are of the dishonest type that
nearly destroyed our nation in 2008. Furthermore, such a standard
would limit the Commerce Clause power in a way not only
distinguishable from the Lochner era, but hopefully also acceptable
to Justice Ginsberg herself who feared the era’s reemergence.62
The Pre-Sebelius IP Cases
The Second and Eleventh Circuits have drawn upon a
number of Supreme Court interpretations of the Commerce Clause
to uphold the copyright bootlegging provision as constitutional.
Both found that the Copyright Clause does not positively forbid
Congress “from extending copyright-like protection under other
constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, to works of
authorship that may not meet the fixation requirement inherent in
the term ‘Writings.’”63 However, both also recognized the Supreme
Court’s acknowledgement that “in some circumstances the
Commerce Clause cannot be used to eradicate a limitation placed

61

Matthew 25:40 ("Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of
these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.").
62
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
63
U.S. v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 1999) (it is notable
that this case did not consider the "limited times" limit because it was not raised
in trial whereas Martignon did). See also U.S. v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149,
152 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Congress exceeds its power under the Commerce Clause by
transgressing limitations of the Copyright Clause only when (1) the law it enacts
is an exercise of the power granted Congress by the Copyright Clause and (2) the
resulting law violates one or more specific limits of the Copyright Clause." But,
"[g]iven the nexus between bootlegging and commerce, it is clear that absent any
limitations stemming from the Copyright Clause, Congress would have had the
power to enact [the Bootlegging Provision] under the Commerce Clause.").
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upon Congressional power in another grant of power.”64 However,
both decisions seized on a weak logical inference from case law;
that because Gibbons struck a tax law and not a tax-like law for
being non-uniform, the Commerce Clause could not act as a
workaround for an actual “copyright law” but could act as a
workaround for “copyright-like laws.”65
The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate the
“channels of interstate commerce”, instrumentalities, persons or
things in interstate commerce, and “intrastate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.”66 Thus, the applicable test
was “whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated
activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.”67 The substantial

64

Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279–80 (citing Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982) ("[I]if we were to hold that Congress had
the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, we would eradicate form the Constitution a limitation on the power of
Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.")). See also Martignon, 492 F.3d at 149.
65
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150 ("[I]n order to demonstrate unconstitutionality,
Martignon must establish that [the Bootlegging Provision] is a copyright law and
not just that it is copyright-like.") (citing Gibbons, 45 U.S. at 465; Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U. S., 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964); In re Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 89 (1879)); Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280 (citing Gibbons 45 U.S. at
465; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 89). See
also Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int'l Prods., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176
(C.D. Cal. 2005) ("In contrast to [Gibbons], the question is not whether
legislation empowered by the Copyright Clause—but invalid under it—can
otherwise be empowered by the Commerce Clause. The question is whether
matters not encompassed within the Copyright Clause can be addressed by the
Commerce Clause free of the restrictions of the Copyright Clause. The answer to
that question is, clearly, yes."). But see Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012)
(the answer is not clearly yes anymore).
66
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
558–59 (1995) ("The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to legislate
regarding three things: (i) the use of channels of interstate commerce; (ii)
instrumentalities and persons or things in interstate commerce; and (iii) intrastate
activities that substantially effect interstate commerce.")). See also Martignon,
492 F.3d at 152–53.
67
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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effects test required a law to “bear more than a generic relationship
to several steps removed from interstate commerce and it must be a
relationship that is apparent, not creatively inferred.”68
Martignon and Moghadam upheld a criminal statute known
as the Copyright Bootlegging Provision as bearing the requisite
apparent relationship to interstate commerce.69 The provision
provides criminal relief of five years of imprisonment (or ten years
for the second offense) when a person, “without the consent of the
performer or performers, ‘knowingly’ and for ‘commercial
advantage or private financial gain’ (1) fixes the sounds or sounds
and images of a live musical performance in a copy or phonorecord,
or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a performance from
an unauthorized fixation, (2) transmits or otherwise communicates
to the public the sounds or images of a live musical performance, or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or
offers to rent or traffics in any recording described in (1).”70
Finally, Congress believed that it was legislating under its grant of
power from the Copyright Clause so it did not include a
jurisdictional element to the law, which would normally appear in
laws enacted under the Commerce Clause.71 Nevertheless, the
courts decided that the court could, on its own initiative, test the

68

Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (quoting United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d
1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997) opinion vacated in part on reh'g, 133 F.3d 1412
(11th Cir. 1998) (cert denied, 525 U.S. 894) (vacated on other grounds) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
69
Anti-Bootlegging Provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006).
70
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 142–43 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006)). See
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272.
71
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 143 (citing S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 224 (1994));
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 ("Congress thought it was acting under the
Copyright Clause") (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562–63 ("Congressional findings
would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect
was visible to the naked eye. . . . Congress normally is not required to make
[such] formal findings.")).
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jurisdictional scope and decide whether the statute fits within the
limit of interstate commerce.72
Martignon found that the Bootlegging Provision “regulates
only fixing, selling, distributing, and copying with a commercial
motive, activities at the core of the Commerce Clause.”73 But this is
assuming that intangibles act the same way marijuana, a tangible
good, does. Moghadam cited to Wickard, a Supreme Court opinion
about farming wheat that held a Federal law constitutional even
though it regulated growing wheat for home consumption because it
depressed interstate commerce.74 Again, wheat is a tangible good.
Moghadam distinguished itself from Lopez, a Supreme Court
opinion that struck a law banning guns within 1000 feet of a school
because it “ha[d] nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms.”75 In so doing it concluded “the antibootlegging statute has a
sufficient connection to interstate and foreign commerce to meet the
Lopez test.”76
The Second and Eleventh Circuits arrived at their
conclusions about how bootlegging implicates commerce by mixing
in an expansive conception of property.77 In fact, Martignon said of
the bootlegging provisions that “[i]t is, perhaps, analogous to the
law of criminal trespass.”78 Both Moghadam and Martignon
included trademark and copyright under the category of
“Intellectual Property” and decided that trademark laws are thus
72

Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 ("The absence of such a jurisdictional element
simply means that courts must determine independently whether the statute
regulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[] interstate
commerce.") (quoting Lopez 514 U.S. at 561) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005)).
74
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276.
75
Id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942); Lopez 514 U.S.
at 561).
76
Id. at 1277.
77
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150–51 ("[T]hough allocation of property rights is not
a sufficient condition for calling something a copyright law… it is a necessary
one."); Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278.
78
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 151.
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copyright-like laws that are entirely enacted under the Commerce
Clause.79 Thus, both courts decided that copyright-like acts could
be justified under the Commerce Clause even if they would have
exceeded limits had they been enacted under the Copyright
Clause.80 Then the courts distinguished the fact that a law against
criminal trademark infringement was unconstitutional because there
was no jurisdictional element to trigger criminal penalties because
the Trade-mark Cases predated the New Deal expansion of the
Commerce Clause.81 In effect, the court used property to draw an
analogy between trademark and copyright that perhaps it ought
not.82 Then the court used a mere property analogy to infer
Commerce Clause authority, when trademarks can implicate

79

Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278–79 ("Indeed, modern trademark law is built
entirely on the Commerce Clause. . . . and we have found no case which suggests
that trademark law's conferral of protection on unoriginal works somehow runs
afoul of the Copyright Clause.") (citing Michael B. Gerdes, Getting Beyond
Constitutionally Mandated Originality As A Prerequisite for Federal Copyright
Protection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1461, 1470 (1992) ("The constitutionality of current
federal trade-mark legislation . . . supports the conclusion that the Copyright
Clause does not limit Congress's Commerce Clause power to grant copyright-like
protection."); Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146 ("[W]hen an intellectual property law
could not have been enacted pursuant to the Copyright Clause because it governs
works that lack originality, a court should alternatively consider whether it was
validly enacted under the Commerce Clause.") (citing In re Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (noting that trademark protection does not require
originality, however that criminal trademark protection was not bound by
interstate commerce and thus was unconstitutional).
80
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278.
81
Id.
82
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (Trademarks are defined as
anything that signifies in the minds of consumers the origin of goods or services.
This means that granting trademarks protection is entirely driven by a goal of
minimizing customer confusion and is limited by it. This also means that a
trademark is necessarily connected or affixed to a certain class of good, and alone
the mark is no trademark and is not protected). See also Chance v. Pac-Tel
Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that token uses
merely to reserve a mark are not enough to create a trademark protection, and that
to have trademark protection a trademark owner must have engaged in an actual,
bona fide use of the trademark in connection with goods or services).
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interstate commerce whether or not they are labeled “Intellectual
Property” because they are necessarily affixed to goods that are
bought and sold to minimize customer confusion. Copyright laws
neither share this inherent nexus with the marketplace for tangible
goods nor the purpose of minimizing customer confusion. Thus,
trademark laws are probably not copyright-like laws at all and they
do not need an analogy to being intangible property to implicate
interstate commerce.
The purpose of justifying the bootlegging provisions under
the Commerce Clause was to address two of the Copyright Clause
limits it allegedly breached.83 The district court found in Martignon
that, “Congress may not, if the Copyright Clause does not allow for
such legislation, enact the law under a separate grant of power, even
when that separate grant provides proper authority.”84 In fact, this
finding seems to agree with prior Supreme Court precedent as well,
that the Copyright Clause is “both a grant of power and a
limitation.”85 Recognizing these limits, the Second Circuit said that
the question in Martignon was “the extent to which the Copyright
Clause can be read to limit Congress’s power to enact legislation
under the Commerce Clause.”86 However, the Second Circuit
overturned the district court opinion and offered a work around for
express Constitutional limits noting that “[s]ometimes Congress can
enact legislation under one constitutional provision that it couldn’t
under another.”87
83

Martignon, 492 F.3d at 143–44 ("[T]he district court held that [the
bootlegging provisions] could not be sustained under the Copyright Clause
because it 'provides seemingly perpetual protection for unfixed musical
performances.'") (quoting United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
84
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
vacated and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
85
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
86
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 144 ("in limited instances, the expressed limitations on
a clause do apply to externally to another clause") (citing Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468 (1982)).
87
Id. at 146, 148 (The Heart of Atlanta court "simply reasoned that it didn't
matter if Congress lacked the power to enact anti-discrimination legislation
covering private actors under the Fourteenth Amendment as long as it possessed
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Once Moghadam found that the Commerce Clause justified
the constitutionality of the bootlegging provisions, the court refused
to consider whether the Copyright Clause, or any other clause,
sustains the legislation.88 However, had they looked closer at the
copyright act itself they may have found a major problem with their
reasoning. The Moghadam Court decided that though public
performances are not “fixed” they are required to be fixed in order
to be triggered, and thus concluded that it is not completely adverse
to the fixation requirement. However, the Copyright Act’s
definition of fixed already includes these sorts of recordings.
The bootlegging provision’s fixation trigger directly collides
with the Copyright Act’s broad definition of fixation that employs a
legal fiction of “simultaneous fixation” in order to include
transmissions of sporting events and other live televised
performances. The Copyright Act states that a work is “‘fixed’ for
purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission.”89 Thus the victims of
bootlegging may already have a copyright infringement cause of
action identical to the criminal bootlegging provision that is
enacted, provided that they prove that they “authored” a recording
of the performance. Yet televised performances are “copyright” and
bootlegged televised performances are “copyright-like.” One is
limited by the Copyright Clause and the other is not. Even so
Moghadam boldly states that “common sense” dictates that the

sufficient power under the Commerce Clause.") (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)).
88
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277 ("[T]he various grants of legislative authority
contained in the Constitution stand alone and must be independently analyzed.")
(citing to Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250 ("[W]e have therefore not considered
the other grounds relied upon. This is not to say that the remaining authority upon
which it acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass but
merely that since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have
considered it alone.")).
89
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (definition of "fixed"); H. R. REP. NO.
94-1476 (1976) (commenting on the legal fiction of "simultaneous fixation").
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bootlegging provision is not at odds with the fixation requirement
whereas Gibbons was in conflict with the uniform taxation limit.90
Sebelius arguably overturns both Moghadam and Martignon
in that the Commerce Clause may no longer be used to supplement
other grants of legislative power.91 However, it is not clear whether
the Commerce Clause is limited by definition,92 or by means of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.93 The practical effect of the opinion
of the court, which was underwritten by the Ginsberg dissent for
purposes of the remedy, was that a Constitutional limit can be
worked around even without the support of another grant of power
like the Commerce Clause.94 However, according to Chief Justice
Roberts it is unlikely that the Constitutional grounding will merely
shift while leaving the ultimate outcome of Moghadam and
Martignon intact because doing so would render some
Constitutional provisions “superfluous.”95 Thus, the Court should
hold that the Article I grants of power must coexist and thus not
accept a reading of the constitution that leaves portions superfluous
and without effect.
Martignon was remanded to decide whether the traditional
contours of copyright have been abandoned and whether the
bootlegging provision violates First Amendment Free speech.96
Though the issue was not decided, the government’s argument that
it had the authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause might be
90

Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012). Cf. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150–51;
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278.
92
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (Congress cannot force
someone into an interstate market in order to justify their regulation under the
Commerce Clause).
93
Id. at 2592, 2599 (noting that necessary and proper actually precludes
improper laws).
94
Id. at 2607; Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (Ginsberg, J. concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
95
Id. at 2586 (finding that if the Judiciary continued reading an over-expansive
Commerce Clause power, "many of the provisions of the constitution would be
superfluous.").
96
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 143–44. See generally Moghadam, 175 F.3d (did not
raise the First Amendment).
91
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in conflict with Chief Justice Roberts’ constitutional
interpretation.97 The Supreme Court has held that copyright law
itself is not immune to First Amendment scrutiny.98 However, it
also held that if the traditional contours are abided by, then First
Amendment scrutiny is unlikely. The traditional contours of
copyright include fair use and the idea/expression distinction.99
Martignon and Moghadam pick up on a recurring theme in
IP law: that international treaties play a significant role in judicial
and legislative processes. The bootlegging provisions were one of
the enactments of the World Trade Organization’s Uruguay Round
Trade Agreements.100 The WTO currently embraces 159 countries
as signatories to the agreements.101 Any international protection of
IP must be gained through treaty. Furthermore, treaties are not
automatically enacted in the United States. In order for a treaty to
obtain the force of law it must also be enacted by Congress.
However, treaties find support by those who wish to convince
Congress to expand IP protection to that effect, as well as convince
the judiciary that an enacted law is legitimate.102

97

Compare Martignon, 492 F.3d at 143–44, with Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2592,
2599 (noting that necessary and proper actually precludes improper laws).
98
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003) (copyright acts are not
"categorically immune to challenges under the First Amendment.").
99
17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107 (2013). See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540 (1985) ("[T]he First Amendment's protections [are]
embodied in the [Copyright] Act's distinction between copyrightable expression
and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and
comment traditionally afforded by fair use.").
100
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994).
101
Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/org6_e.htm (159 members as of March 2, 2013) (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
102
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (citing Todd D. Patterson, The Uruguay
Round's Anti-Bootlegging Provision: A Victory for Musical Artists and Record
Companies, 15 WIS. INT'L L.J. 371, 380–83 (1997)); Martignon, 492 F.3d at 142.
Cf. Zack Whittaker, How ACTA Would Affect You: FAQ, ZDNET (Jan. 29, 2012),
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/london/how-acta-would-affect-you-faq/2773
(explaining the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) which has not

Bringing America Back to the Future

27

—The bootlegging provisions are only one of many ways
Copyright law has tried to keep up with the times.103 Accordingly, a
major law enacted to modernize copyright law was the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). One of its purposes was to
prevent pirates from making perfect copies of works that can be
rapidly disseminated on the internet without restriction.104 Among
its provisions, the DMCA states that “[n]o person shall circumvent
a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title.”105
Since this anti-circumvention provision modified
preexisting copyright law, its constitutionality has not been
challenged in a way similar to the bootlegging provisions for
exceeding the limits in the Copyright Clause. However, since it was
presumably enacted under the Copyright Clause without support of
the Commerce Clause, the Copyright limits are still in play. Thus, if
the underlying copyright being protected by a DMCA anticircumvention provision fails to meet the copyright goal of creating
“progress” in knowledge and learning then anti-circumvention
measures should no longer receive DMCA protection.106

been adopted, but may have had the same effect as legislation in the long run if it
were).
103
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) ("Copyright laws have struggled through the
years to keep pace with emerging technology from the struggle over music placed
on a player piano roll in the 1900's to the introduction of the VCR in the 1980's.
With this constant evolution in technology, the law must adapt in order to make
digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyright materials."). See
The Anti-Circumvention Provision 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
104
H.R. REP. NO.105-551 (I), at 11 (1998).
105
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
106
Compare Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965,
972 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that a company that made Game Genies was a fair
user, even though their product allowed users to cheat on their Nintendo games
without Nintendo's authorization), with MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't,
Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) opinion amended and superseded on
denial of reh'g, No. 09-15932, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011)
(deciding that the DMCA anti-circumvention provision could be enforced
without considering Game-Genie-like fair uses, and rejecting the Federal Circuit's
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In fact, property principles have been employed to justify
these constitutionally questionable penalties. It seems that an
implicit acknowledgement has been adopted by courts that rights to
liberty and security in anything that seems like property, including
at least one form of online currency,107 supplements the
constitutionality of Congress harshly regulating the so called
hackers. Thus traditional works, like literary, audiovisual, and
musical works, have been granted broad protection under the anticircumvention provisions.108 These protections were justified over
public outcry for the protection of free speech when a
circumventing hack, made by a Norwegian teenager, had already
been distributed widely. In fact, T-shirts bearing the illegal hack
were made, distributed and worn by members of the public.109
Arguably, under the court’s decision, the T-shirt wearers could have
been rounded up and arrested on criminal charges for distributing
the hack.
The DMCA has not only been raised to protect traditional
works, however. One case in the Federal Circuit and another in the
requirement of a nexus of the circumvention with a substantial underlying
copyrighted work).
107
Compare MDY Indus.629 F.3d, at 935 (protecting Blizzard's right to manage
its video game's online virtual economy and currency which can be bought and
sold for real money and valuated in terms of U.S. dollars), with Reuben Grinberg,
Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH.
L.J. 159, 174 (2012) (describing many online currencies that exist in a grey
market and may eventually be found illegal for a number of reasons including tax
evasion and counterfeiting).
108
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001); 321
Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1093
(N.D. Cal. 2004). See, e.g., Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641
F. Supp. 2d 913, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2009); DirecTV, Inc. v. Randy Borow, No. 03C-2581, 2005 WL 43261 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2005); United States v. Whitehead,
532 F.3d 991, 992 (9th Cir. 2008); CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 105
(1st Cir. 2008).
109
Farhad Manjoo, Court to Address DeCSS T-Shirt, WIRED (Aug. 2, 2000),
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2000/08/37941; DVD Copy
Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 871 (2003) (describing how a
Norwegian teenager was able to reverse engineer DeCSS, write a circumvention
code and disseminate it throughout the world on the internet).
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Sixth Circuit involved plaintiffs who sought to use the anticircumvention protections to protect encryptions as copyrighted
works in themselves, with no other underlying copyright being
protected.110 One involved garage door openers that had embedded
anti-circumvention codes to create an obstruction for consumers
who tried to purchase used “aftermarket” parts, apparently to
increase the sale of new garage door openers.111 The other involved
software embedded in ink cartridges for home printers that counted
the number of pages printed and indicated to the printer that the ink
was empty before it was actually empty to get consumers to buy
more ink cartridges.112 The page counting program had an
encryption that was being circumvented with a hack to allow the
user to use all the ink they purchased.113 Both of these cases
decided that there was not a sufficient nexus between these
encryptions and copyrighted material to use copyright law to
prosecute the “hackers” otherwise known as the plaintiff’s
customers.114 The “thin” copyright in the software encryptions
protecting the garage door openers and ink cartridges was not
enough.115
The Kirtsaeng decision might extend to support these
decisions by balancing ambiguous portions of the anticircumvention provision with common law rights in physical
property.116 Arguably the garage door and ink cartridge anti110

Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring a "critical nexus between access and protection");
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th
Cir. 2004) (all three liability provisions of this section of the DMCA require the
claimant to show that the 'technological measure' at issue 'controls access to a
work protected under this title,' and that the computer code composing the anticircumvention measure was not one of these protected works).
111
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183.
112
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 563.
113
Id. at 564.
114
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204; Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550.
115
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1186; Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550.
116
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 17, 26 (2013) (especially because
interpreting "lawfully made under this title" may be similar to interpreting "a
work protected under this title" as Lexmark and Chamberlain did). See 17 U.S.C.
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circumvention measures trespassed on the consumer’s common law
rights to alienate, destroy, and otherwise manage their physical
property.117 Somehow, it seems that the anti-circumvention
provision gave printer and garage door opener companies the color
of legitimacy when they violated physical property rights.
Similarly, in January, 2013 the Librarian of Congress removed the
exception to violations of the anti-circumvention provision for
unlocking cell phones.118 Whether there are physical property rights
within the purchased machinery of a cell phone for consumers to
justify unlocking cell phones to switch service providers is
debatable.119 However, according to the FCC it is likely that
Congress will limit the DMCA before the question is submitted to
the Court.120
The anti-circumvention nexus requirement was rejected by
the Ninth Circuit in MDY Industries to allow Blizzard’s use of the
DMCA to protect its management and allocation of digital gold and
experience in its popular video game World of Warcraft (WoW).121

§ 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (Outlawing the circumvention of technological measures
used to protect "a work protected under this title.").
117
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 17 (Interpreting "lawfully made under this
title" so as to "retain the substance of common law." In this case, the lawful
consumer's property right to alienation of chattels).
118
Exemption to Prohibition Against Circumvention, 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2013)
(no longer including an exemption for unlocking cell phones).
119
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 17.
120
Wireless Device Independence Act of 2013, S. 467, 113th Cong. (2013)
(Introduced on March 5, 2013); Statement from FCC Chairman Julius
Genachowski on the Copyright Office of the Library of Cong. Position on
DMCA & Unlocking New Cell Phones, 2013 WL 812666 (F.C.C. Mar. 4, 2013)
(asking the legislature to rethink their stance on default criminalization the jail
breaking of cellphones); Statement of Comm'r Ajit Pai on Unlocking Cell
Phones, 2013 WL 953595 (F.C.C. Mar. 11, 2013) ("American consumers should
not face jail time for unlocking their cell phones." Pai also commended
Congress's movement toward adopting the Wireless Device Independence Act of
2013).
121
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010)
opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, No. 09-15932, 2011 WL
538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011). See also Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v.
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The constitutionality of the DMCA anti-circumvention provision
for adhering to all of the Copyright Clause limits of “writings,”
“authors,” “limited times” and “progress,” should arise once a
nexus requirement is abandoned.122 Otherwise, statements such as
“the founding social contract of the new millennium [is] the End
User License Agreement (EULA), [and] not the U.S. Constitution”
will cease to be metaphorical.123 Blizzard’s EULA and Terms of
Use agreement (ToU) includes a licensing agreement that regulates
“valuable in-game currency.”124 The ToU also bans bots and
hacks.125
The defendant in MDY Industries created and sold bots that
were able to mine digital gold and increase the experience of a
WoW character automatically, playing the game on autopilot while
the user is away from the game.126 By September 2008, the

Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (using the DMCA anticircumvention provisions to protect underlying trademark infringement).
122
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 17; Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1186;
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550.
123
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual
Control of Virtual Worlds, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 43, 44 (2011).
124
Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. and Vivendi Games, Inc. Motion for Summary
Judgment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, (March 21,
2008), MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 206CV02555). See also Battle.net, Terms of Use, Blizzard
Entertainment, http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/about/termsofuse.html (last
visited April 20, 2013) (prohibiting users from "gather[ing] in-game currency,
items or resources for sale outside of the Game without Blizzard's
authorization"); MDY Indus., 624 F.3d at 935 (noting that WoW users gain access
to "in-game currency, weapons and armor" including a comprehensive economic
system); World of Warcraft, End User License Agreement, Blizzard
Entertainment, http://sea.blizzard.com/en-sg/company/legal/wow_eula.html (last
visited April 20, 2013).
125
World of Warcraft, End User License Agreement, Blizzard Entertainment,
http://sea.blizzard.com/en-sg/company/legal/wow_eula.html (last visited April
20, 2013); World of Warcraft, Terms of Use, Blizzard Entertainment
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last visited April 20,
2013)
126
Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. and Vivendi Games, Inc., MDY
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defendant generated $3.5 million gross revenues in sales of these
bots.127 His actions, and the use of the bots by purchasers, may have
breached the EULA and ToU. Thus, breach of contract could have
decided this case. Nevertheless, the property driven sledgehammer
of copyright law was invoked instead.128 Furthermore, the use and
distribution of the bots were found to violate the DMCA even
though the Warden program that the bots “circumvented” was
created and implemented by Blizzard after the defendant had
already created and distributed bots.129 Thus, not only was there
possibly no underlying copyright infringement being protected by
this case’s finding, but also there was initially no circumvention
occurring.
One scholar has counted the dangers of the use of private
contract to limit the use of the internet and the DMCA backing up
digital rights management [DRM] encryptions.130 It is said that the
effect would be to cast technology as “bad” because it reduces the
rents earned by copyright owners, or internet and technology
businesses in general if the nexus requirement is abandoned.131 The
Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (No.
206CV02555) ("Glider users relied on the [MDY bots] to exploit WoW for
commercial purposes, namely the 'farming' [sic] of in-game assets for the purpose
of selling the assets in real money transactions outside the game.").
127
MDY Indus., 624 F.3d at 936.
128
Peter S. Menell, Governance of Intellectual Resources and Disintegration of
Intellectual Property in the Digital Age, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1531
(2011) ("When the only tool that you have in your box is a hammer, every
problem looks like a nail.").
129
MDY Indus.,624 F.3d at 936.
130
Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 280–82 (2006) (seeing the use
of “[p]rivate contracts” to enhance the “power of private property holders” to
back “digital encryption code” with the legal code to “control the people’s access
to knowledge” as a special challenge for democracy).
131
Id. (citing Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 940–66 (1999)). See also TracFone
Wireless, Inc. v. SND Cellular, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(using the DMCA to protect the "goodwill [, trademarks, and other intangible]
property" from the resale market awarding damages of over $11 million in
statutory damages); Microsoft Corp. v. EEE Bus. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1051,
1059 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that trafficking counterfeit software licensing
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ultimate result of abandoning nexus will limit the democratizing
effects of the internet, the success of new authors, and in so doing
destroy “the liberation potential for poor underclasses”
worldwide.132 Furthermore, without a nexus requirement, there does
not seem to be a meaningful distinction that would keep copyright
from protecting other digital currencies, some of which are actually
backed by gold and, in the future, could compete with the U.S.
dollar.133 These currencies exist in a grey market that the U.S.
government may decide to crack down on for a number of reasons
including tax evasion and counterfeiting.134 Copyright and contract
law should not be used to legitimize anti-circumvention protection
of content that might be illegal, especially when the protected
content bears no nexus with copyrighted works.
As were the bootlegging provisions, the anti-circumvention
provisions are a creature of international law.135 In fact, the
keys without authorization is considered a violation of the DMCA); Craigslist,
Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2010)(finding
that automated website use that circumvents CAPTCHA keys violates the
DMCA).
132
Sunder, supra note 130 at 280–82. Compare Pearl Invs., LLC v. Standard
I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 349 (D. Me. 2003) (finding that using a VPN
violates the anti-circumvention provisions), with Ai Weiwei's blog, A Digital
Rallying Cry, THE ECONOMIST, (April 12, 2011) http://www.economist.com/
blogs/prospero/2011/04/ai_weiweis_blog (noting that a contemporary artist and
Chinese dissident uses a VPN to disseminate his works and cries for national
transparency via twitter. Also China's golden shield law known as "the great
firewall" is used to block out western internet businesses to preserve similar
Chinese businesses that are highly censored by the Chinese government. For
example, Weibo is the Chinese Facebook and Youku is the Chinese YouTube).
See also Star Chang, Ai Weiwei's 'Gangnam Style' Video is Banned in China,
M.I.C. GADGET, (Oct. 26, 2012) http://micgadget.com/31151/ai-weiweisgangnam-style-video-is-banned-in-china/ (something that might fall into the
"parody" category protected by fair use in the U.S.).
133
Grinberg, supra note 107, at 174.
134
Id. at 191.
135
Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1194
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that the DMCA was enacted as a condition of the World
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty) (citing WIPO Treaty, Apr.
12, 1997, art. 11, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105–17 (1997)).
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perception that developing nations are not enforcing IP protection
enough has inspired global enforcement efforts by Homeland
Security.136 Not only does the movement to globalize intangible
property threaten to render “fair use” obsolete and further endanger
free expression and the public domain,137 it might ensure that
developing nations never embrace a robust freedom of expression.
All this to protect the addictiveness of a video game that is unlikely
to create progress in knowledge and learning at all.
The DMCA has not expressly invoked the traditional
contours of copyright per se, but it does have some limits that could
protect free speech. For example, the Librarian of Congress is
allowed to adopt circumvention exceptions every 3 years.138 The
Librarian had adopted exceptions for obsolete software and
unlocking cell phones. However, in early 2013 the Librarian
removed the cell phone unlocking exception. Under the Ninth
Circuit’s nexus-less test, and without a constitutional challenge, this
could represent a huge antitrust problem in telecommunications that
essentially overturns the effect of Carterfone.139 There are also a
136

Chinese Man Guilty of $100 Million Hi-Tech Software Piracy, THE
ECONOMIC TIMES (Jan. 9, 2013), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/
2013-01-09/news/36237513_1_piracy-operation-software-titles-copyright
("Li
mistakenly thought he was safe from the long arm of HSI, hiding halfway around
the world in cyberspace anonymity.") (quoting ICE Director John Morton). But
see China's Internet: A Giant Cage, THE ECONOMIST (April 6, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expectedhelp-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled; The Machinery of Control: Cat
and Mouse, THE ECONOMIST (April 6, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/
special-report/21574629-how-china-makes-sure-its-internet-abides-rules-cat-andmouse.
137
Sunder, supra note 130, at 282. See also Alessandra Garbagnati, The Wrath
of the Blizz King: How the Ninth Circuit's Decision in Mdy Industries, Inc. v.
Blizzard Ent. May Slay the Game Genie, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 313,
314 (2012) (explaining how the MDY Indus. decision could overrule the Game
Genie decision).
138
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006).
139
In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d
420, 424 (1968) (deciding that the Carterfone could compete with the telephone
service provider's competing device). See F.C.C. Chairman Julius Genachowski
Statement on Preserving Internet Freedom & Openness, 2010 WL 5179798
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number of limited exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions
enumerated in the DMCA.140
Fair use in a DMCA context would go unrecognized without
a nexus requirement.141 In fact, without requiring a nexus there may
be no copyrighted material to apply the four-part fair use test to in
anti-circumvention cases.142 Furthermore, a nexus requirement is
necessary in order to preserve the required protection of First
Amendment free speech. As a part of the nexus test, a court could
determine the underlying work’s thinness of protection and its
situation close to or far from the “core” of copyright protection.143
This could enable reasonable findings that in some circumstances

(F.C.C. Dec. 21, 2010) ("Years after the Carterfone decision, as we entered the
early days of the Internet age, the Commission reaffirmed its policy of openness
and competition by protecting freedom on both the access layer and the
architectural layer of the network."). See also Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention
Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1139 (2003) (arguing that copyright misuse be
extended to DMCA violations) (citing Lasercomb America Inc. v. Reynolds 911
F.2d 970 (4th Cir.) (1990)); Statement from F.C.C. Chairman Julius
Genachowski on the Copyright Office of the Library of Cong. Position on
DMCA & Unlocking New Cell Phones, 2013 WL 812666 (F.C.C. Mar. 4, 2013)
("From a communications policy perspective, this raises serious competition and
innovation concerns, and for wireless consumers, it doesn't pass the common
sense test.").
140
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D), (a)(2)(D), (b), (d)–(k) (2006) (discussing that The
Librarian of Congress can publish exceptions to anti-circumvention violation
every 3 years, there are a few listed exemptions in (d)–(k) and not prohibiting
acts of individual circumvention that protect alleged copyright rights, that are
unrelated to access itself).
141
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2)(C) (2006) (stating that the DMCA anticircumvention provisions should not affect free speech and fair use).
142
See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir.
2010) opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g., No. 09-15932, 2011
WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011) (not requiring nexus and not considering fair
use).
143
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (considering
whether a work was "closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
others."); Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349
(1991) ("[T]he copyright in a factual compilation is thin.").
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protecting EULAs and ToUs with copyright statutory damages and
criminal punishment may constitute a violation of free speech.
The effect of Sebelius on a potential constitutional challenge
of the DMCA that it circumvents the Copyright Clause’s express
limits and the First Amendment is not yet known. However,
Sebelius has called into question the Supreme Court’s past
Constitutional reasoning that the Copyright and Patent Clause
grants Congress “broad decision-making leeway.”144 Even its recent
finding that “[n]othing in the text of the Copyright Clause confines
the ‘Progress of Science’ exclusively to ‘incentives for creation’”
may require some explaining.145 In fact, the entire utilitarian regime
underpinning the last era of Intellectual Property jurisprudence may
rightfully come under attack because the Commerce Clause may no
longer supplement the entire Copyright and Patent Clause’s grant of
power.146
A “free-riding” rationale, buttressed by Utilitarian and
Lockean thought, has been an essential foundation to the legislation

144

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 263 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the "the broad decisionmaking leeway that the Copyright Clause
grants Congress.").
145
Golan v. Holder 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012).
146
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588, 2643 (dissenting opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kennedy, giving a limiting view of the Commerce Clause).
See also Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 37–70, 166–209, 294–333 (giving a
utilitarian rationale for copyright, trademark and patents that works around the
constitutional limits on IP rights that relies on the marketplace and freedom to
solve the possible problems with exceeding the Constitution's limits); Wendy J.
Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982). But
see Sunder, supra note 130, at 283; Lemley, supra note 22, at 1031 (casting free
competition as the norm, and IP rights as an exception to the norm); Letter From
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Doc. 12, Writings 13:333--35, (Aug. 13,
1813), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
a1_8_8s12.html ("Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in
the progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive
fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in
exclusive and stable property.").
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of an ever-growing body of IP protections.147 Free-riding was also
used in the Ginsberg concurrence in Sebelius and was not drawn
upon by any of the remaining Justices in Sebelius.148 Thus, freeriding can no longer per se justify the constitutionality of federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause. As made apparent in
Kirtsaeng, the Court should finally return to its finding in Dowling
v. U.S., that copyright is “subjected to precisely defined limits,”149
and its decision in U.S. v. Paramount Pictures that “the copyright
law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration.”150
The Kirtsaeng Decision
The Supreme Court seems to have finally taken a course of
“simplicity and coherence” when interpreting copyright law.151 The
Court decided on a reading of “lawfully made under this title” as a
non-geographical phrase, overturning dicta in Quality King that
suggested the opposite.152 Thus, the court found that the copyright
limit of “first sale” applied to works legally sold or distributed
abroad and copyright owners would not be able to police imports of
them into the United States.153 To justify its position, the Supreme
Court drew upon the Constitutional limit of “progress,”154 the
147

Lemley, supra note 22, at 1066–67; David McGowan, Copyright
Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 7, 38, 71–72 (2004).
148
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2623–24 (Ginsberg, J. concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); S. REP. NO.105-190, at 2 (1998).
149
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216–17 (1985) ("the copyright
owner . . . holds no ordinary chattel . . . for the copyright holder's dominion is
subjected to precisely defined limits. It follows that interference with copyright
does not easily equate with theft, conversion or fraud.").
150
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). C.f. infra note
255, and accompanying text.
151
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 12 (2013).
152
Id. at 24–25, 30, 33 (citing Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research
Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 143–154 (1998)).
153
Id. at 26.
154
Id. at 19 ("Association of libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies,
consumer-goods retailers, and museums point to various ways in which a
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founders’ arguments for copyright as a “limited monopoly,”155 and
15th Century property common law.156 It also noted that Thomas
Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin obtained collections of foreign
books for personal and commercial use in the manner being
challenged by the plaintiff in this case.157 In fact, this decision
avoided branding Jefferson and Franklin “pirates and thieves” by
today’s low bar copyright infringement standards. It also noted that
a wide variety of items resold internationally bear copies of
“copyrightable software programs or packaging” and thus copyright
law could halt the resale of all sorts of physical property.158
Briefs submitted by libraries, museums, used book sellers
and technology companies convinced the Supreme Court that
limiting the first sale doctrine geographically would not create
“progress” as required by the Constitution or be coherent with other
Constitutional limits.159 Thus, Constitutional limits have finally
begun to play a role in stopping copyright expansion in appropriate
ways. The Court also seemed to hint that readings of “lawfully
made under this title” that limited first sale geographically were

geographical interpretation would fail to further basic constitutional copyright
objectives, in particular 'promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'")
(quoting U.S CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8).
155
Id. at 31–32 ("The Constitution described the nature of American copyright
law by providing Congress with the power to "secur[e] to "[a]uthors" "for limited
[t]imes" the "exclusive [r]ight to their . . . [w]ritings." Art. I Section 8 cl. 8. The
Founders, too, discussed the need to grant an author a limited right to exclude
competition.") (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31,
1788), in 13 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 442–43 (J. Boyd ed. 1956)
(arguing against the grant of any monopoly); Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 13 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14, at
16, 21 (arguing for a limited monopoly to secure production)).
156
Id. at 17 ("In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the common law's
refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chattels. ") (citing Charles M.
Gray, Two Contributions to Coke Studies, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1135 (2005)).
157
Id. at 20–21.
158
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 21 (2013) (including "automobiles,
microwaves, calculators, mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers.").
159
Id.at 23.
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either illogical, disingenuous or both.160 The majority did not
mention the importance of honesty and seemed to limit its stance to
requiring precedence.161 Thus it found precedent in a centuries old
right to alienate physical property recognized in common law, and
rested its opinion there.162 However, along with the traditional right
to alienation of physical property found in common law histories,
there also exists a judicial interest in upholding honesty through
formalism.163
Kirtsaeng’s favored canon of statutory interpretation was:
“[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the
common law we must presume that Congress intended to retain the
substance of the common law.”164 Thus the Court decided that
Congress must have meant for the first sale doctrine to limit a
copyright holder’s ability to police parallel market pricing, in order
to preserve the right to alienate chattels.165 It also noted that no
framer mentioned that copyright should confer a right to police
parallel market pricing.166
Justices Ginsberg, Scalia and Kennedy concurred in a
dissent that may be the most telling of how far property principles
have gone astray to justify expansive IP protection.167 The dissent
called upon the position the U.S. had taken on international
160

Id. at 24 (stating that the other readings "require too many unprecedented
jumps over linguistic and other hurdles that in our view are insurmountable.").
161
Id.
162
Id. at 17.
163
BAKER, supra note 12, at 320; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*449.
164
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 17 (citing Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct.
2278, 2290 n.13 (2010)).
165
Id. at 31–32.
166
Id. at 32 ("But the Constitution’s language nowhere suggests that its limited
exclusive right should include a right to divide markets or a concomitant right to
charge different purchasers different prices for the same book, say to increase or
to maximize gain. Neither, to our knowledge, did any Founder make any such
suggestion.").
167
Compare Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) (2013), with Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92.
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copyright protection according to TRIPs, the WTO and WIPO.168
The treaties we have pushed upon most of the developing world do
not include the same kind of first sale and fair use exceptions that
we allow our own citizens.169 The treaties have called a cut back on
the first sale limitation a solution to international copyright
exhaustion.170 Thus the dissent argued that the copyright act should
allow copyright owners to police imports of all copies of copyright
protected items, regardless if they were legally or illegally
distributed abroad.171 The dissent’s reasons for so arguing rested in
applying traditional property law concepts to copyright itself.172
The majority only uses the word property once, when
quoting the dissent when it argued that “‘the sale in one country of
a good’ does not ‘exhaus[t] the intellectual-property owner’s right
to control the distribution of that good elsewhere.’”173 The dissent,
relying on international agreements and the legislation inspired by
them, used the word property 15 times.174 International treaties have
commandeered property law to create an over expansive conception
of limited monopoly rights. Having rested upon international law,
the dissent could not avoid legitimizing a copyright-as-property
view. The majority found that the dicta of Quality King,175 proposed
by the dissent, was incorrect.176 This decision removes one
incentive for sending American manufacturing jobs overseas and
protects purchasers of tangible goods from overbroad IP regulation.
The result being that the distribution of cheap second hand goods is

168

Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 18–19.
Chang, supra note 132 (something that might clearly fall into the "parody"
category protected by fair use in the U.S.).
170
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 18–19.
171
Id. at 20.
172
Id.
173
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 33.
174
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 3, 12, 18–22, 33.
175
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 3 (citing Quality
King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U. S. 135, 143–54
(1998)).
176
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 30, 33.
169
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not kept from American consumers by copyright enforcement at the
U.S. boarder.
In fact, it would not be honest to underwrite the view that
corporations have the right, due to the copyright in the trademarks
affixed to their products, to charge American consumers more
money for things they sell to foreigners at a much cheaper price.177
Nevertheless, the going value of companies that provide
copyrighted and patented content is often propped up by a blanket
expectation that Americans pay more,178 so they have global losses
for every good or service they provide that had not been paid-in-full
at the prices they set.179 The practice of divvying up the paychecks
of Americans (or any foreigner) as a matter of property has created
false security in corporate value that distorts the stock market and
continues to cause market harm to stock owners.180 The idea that
177

Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) (Deciding that China
did not breach Article 61 of TRIPs by interpreting "commercial scale" to mean "a
significant magnitude of infringement activity." Thus affirming China's
limitations on criminal enforcement of copyright infringement. The U.S. sought
to leverage China into cracking down on infringement by criminalizing all
infringers for the purpose of commercial gain).
178
Open Letter from Bill Gates to Hobbyists (Feb. 3, 1976), available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File: Bill_Gates_Letter_to_Hobbyists.jpg (calling
hobbyists thieves for not paying him for the software his company provided
them).
179
BSA & IDC, 2007 Piracy Study, BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (last visited
April 21, 2013), available at http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2007/studies/
2007_global_piracy_study.pdf (This study showed higher piracy rates in foreign
countries like China at 82% and Armenia at 93%, and the U.S. as participating in
the lowest amount of piracy at 20%, but also recording a $1.34 billion more
losses in the U.S. as compared to China in 2007). See Mike Masnick, If It's May
It's Time for the Press to Parrot Bogus Stats Announcement from the BSA,
TECHDIRT (May, 12 2010), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100511/
1516059386.shtml; Mike Masnick, BSA's Canadian Piracy Numbers Based on
Hunches, Not Actual Surveys, TECHDIRT (May, 27, 2009), http://www.techdirt.
com/articles/20090527/1125035034.shtml.
180
Letzing, supra note 10 ("Google said . . . that $2.9 billion of the purchase
price for Motorola was attributable to cash acquired, $2.6 billion was related to
goodwill, $730 million for customer relationships and $670 million for 'other net
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through going business value and intellectual property one might
propertize the future paychecks of others is abominable. This
practice garners unauthorized value from consumer bank accounts
by taking for granted value that has not yet been granted. It is a lie
that lets big business count future business value today, as a matter
of property. It is also a lie that pulls the curtain over the fact that
modern slavery has infected many of the supply chains that these
businesses derive direct benefits from.181 In the end it lets big
business claim untold property value without earning it and
subverts the self-evident truth that we are all created equal by
objectifying the American public and humanity worldwide. In
practical terms, this helps maximize U.S. consumer spending and
personal debt even in the wake of a massive debt crisis without
addressing the most grotesque part of these intangible property
claims: that some of the value claimed is derived from a growing
$20 billion global slave trade industry.182
The dissent’s stance in Kirtsaeng was that copyright should
be imbued with strong property that override even common law
property rights in the underlying physical property. From here the
dissent concluded that the majority “risks undermining the United
States’ credibility on the world stage.”183 However, the majority’s
insistence on “simplicity and coherence” is more likely to vindicate
U.S. credibility abroad.184 The dissent even admitted its argument’s
“potential inconsistency with United States obligations under

assets acquired.'" Google characterized consumer relationships with Motorola
and what consumers thought about Motorola as worth billions of dollars when
consumer's themselves may own their relationships and thoughts. Thus Google
shareholders "purchased" billions of dollars in consumer thoughts and
relationships that is not stable property because it probably is actually owned by
consumers); Ben Fritz, Netflix Stock Plunges 25% After Analysts Slash Estimates,
L.A. TIMES (July 25, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/25/entertainment/
la-et-ct-netflix-stock-drop-20120725 (noting that attempts to expand sales
globally contributed to losses).
181
Supra note 22.
182
Id.
183
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 22.
184
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 12.
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certain bilateral trade agreements.”185 Disingenuous incoherence
and inconsistency are the true culprits here. Emphasizing honesty,
coherence and general clarity is the only way to win back
credibility on the international stage, or any stage for that matter.186
To be clear, the international credibility of the U.S.
businessperson is currently deficient. Recently, the U.S. financial
sector swindled the American middle class and the American
government out of billions of dollars after destroying the global
market through dishonest and at least “incoherent” business
practices.187 Then national and global public outcry stopped SOPA,
PIPA, and ACTA.188 Now, major American copyright owners are
resorting to self-help measures, blocking and degrading internet
access of whomever they find is a copyright infringer.189 These selfhelp measures are directly against the interests of most lower and
middle class copyright owners,190 and they are illegal.191 Even the
185

Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) slip op. at 22.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a), 7.1, 8.1(a), 8.2(a), 8.4(c)
(1983).
187
STOCKMAN, supra note 3, at 631–48 ("No Recovery on Main Street") and at
3–5 (calling Wall Street a gambling hall). See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson &
Louise Story, Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 23, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/business/
24trading.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting the result of "peddling complex
securities" was to cause billions of dollars in losses to "pension funds and
insurance companies.").
188
See Magid, supra note 19 (noting that the laws pit the tech industry against
the entertainment industry); Kain, supra note 19 (noting that ACTA would force
the DMCA on developing nations and is a dangerous law to pass); Meyer, supra
note 19 (noting that massive protests in Europe prompted the European
parliament to reject the treaty).
189
About the Center for Copyright Information, CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFO.,
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/about-cci/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (CCI
is a coalition of major copyright owner interest groups and ISPs, and they are
initiating copyright alert systems in violation of net neutrality).
190
Tarnoff, supra note 18; Ernesto, supra note 18 ("The MPAA, RIAA and the
Internet providers participating in the ‘six strikes’ anti-piracy scheme have
informed the Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee about their
plans."). See also Kneecapping the Future: Comcast’s Unjustified Internet Caps
and the Plan to Kill Video Competition, supra note 18 (reporting that Comcast
186
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thought of abiding this sort of unilateral, private sector regulation of
the internet is the embarrassment here. The FCC has championed
net neutrality and internet freedom in developing countries
encouraging a serious adoption of free speech globally.192In
countries where net neutrality and free speech is opposed, the
internet has been described as a giant cage—actually enhancing the
maneuverability of authoritarian control.193 By supporting foreign
censorship, copyright largess is threatening to delay and destroy the
acceptance of freedom and transparency in countries that
desperately need it,194 directly undermining the FCC’s international
support and encouragement of freedom, and violating net neutrality
and free speech itself.195
has a cap on the data an internet subscriber can download through Comcast, but
exempted its video provider Xfinity); The Facts About AT&T’s Facetime
Blocking, supra note 18.
191
Preserving the Open Internet 47 C.F.R. § 8 (2011).
192
Julius Genachowski, Chairman, F.C.C., Statement on the U.S. Submission of
Initial Input into the International Telecommunication Union's World Conference
on International Telecommunications (Aug. 3, 2012) (noting a fight for "internet
freedom" against "some countries [that] restrict the free flow of information
online"); Julius Genachowski, Chairman, F.C.C., Prepared Remarks for the
International Telecommunications Union Global Symposium for Regulators in
Beirut, Lebanon, ICT: Global Opportunities and Challenges (Nov. 10, 2009)
(touting the FCC's role to preserve a "free, open and robust Internet" as an
example to follow on the world stage).
193
China's Internet: A Giant Cage, supra note 136; The Machinery of Control:
Cat and Mouse, supra note 136.
194
Julius Genachowski, Chairman, F.C.C., Statement on the U.S. Submission of
Initial Input into the International Telecommunication Union's World Conference
on International Telecommunications (Aug. 3, 2012) (noting a fight for "internet
freedom" against "some countries [that] restrict the free flow of information
online"); Julius Genachowski, Chairman, F.C.C., Prepared Remarks for the
International Telecommunications Union Global Symposium for Regulators in
Beirut, Lebanon, ICT: Global Opportunities and Challenges (Nov. 10, 2009)
(touting the FCC's role to preserve a "free, open and robust Internet" as an
example to follow on the world stage).
195
Genachowski, supra note 192, Statement on the U.S. Submission of Initial
Input into the International Telecommunication Union's World Conference on
International Telecommunications; Genachowski, supra note 192, Chairman,
Prepared Remarks for the International Telecommunications Union Global
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—It is unclear how far the inference of real property common
law to expand the first sale doctrine will extend. A Ninth Circuit
district court did not extend first sale to the resale of digital copies
of music in MP3 form.196 Redigi, an online company that facilitated
the resale of digital music at a discounted price, was thus found
liable for copyright infringement. The Court did not allow first sale
to legitimize this kind of resale of used goods. It is unclear how
property common law rights, like a right to alienate, should bear on
digital goods. In the wake of the Redigi opinion, consumers may
opt to purchase physical copies if they wish to have the right to
alienate the items they purchase. However, if consumers abandon or
destroy their copies of digital music files, they will be asked to
purchase a brand new copy at full price. Thus, failing to apply
property law concepts to digital copies of music only seems to work
in the seller’s favor. If digital copies are not “property” then
whether consumers have any rights at all in digital copies of music
is an open question.
Though copyright-as-chattel is entirely an analogy,197 the
underlying information and knowledge from which patents and
copyrights are formed is actually a public good.198 The project of
defining public goods seems to be bound up with First Amendment
interpretation.199 Thus information has a real property explanation
that is recognized in the constitution, as relatively bounteous and
Symposium for Regulators in Beirut, Lebanon, ICT: Global Opportunities and
Challenges.
196
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 12 CIV. 95 RJS, 2013 WL 1286134
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2013).
197
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291 ("It has been pretended by some,
(and in England especially,) that inventors have a natural and exclusive right to
their inventions, and not merely for their own lives, but inheritable to their
heirs."). See generally Bryan Beier, The Perils of Analogical Reasoning: Joseph
William Singer Property and Sovereignty and Property, 1 GEO. MASON U. L.
REV. 33 (1994).
198
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92.
199
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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subject to only momentary possession like air or fire.200 Thus, a real
property (no analogy needed) explanation for copyright and patent
is as a limited monopoly right in a public good (i.e. the public good
of free flowing information, knowledge and education). If people
have a right to alienation of their privately held goods, they might at
least have a right to “proliferate” publically owned goods at least as
much as they paid a limited monopoly owner in a specific
expression of that good in order to use or copy that specific
expression. Thus, through a limited proliferation right based on the
public’s underlying rights to foster free flowing knowledge and
information, digital copies of copyrighted works sold online should
have first sale and other copyright limitations assigned to them.
PART II: THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF PROPERTY
A conception of property seems to be made of two things.
First, property is formed out of a common sense connection with
thing-ownership. Things as necessarily physical things once seemed
to be inferred into our concept of what property was. Second,
property is a highly political creation. In fact it was originally
offered as a vehicle to ensure liberty from government and equality
of class. After the States won the Revolution, overthrowing English
rule in the Americas, the debate over how property should be
conceived settled into a struggle between Libertarian and Liberal
thought. This section explains how the inherent flaws in the
political conception of property have carried us far afield of the
common sense idea that property is related to thing-ownership.

200

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92. C.f. Susan P. Crawford, The
Radio and the Internet, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 961 (2008) (noting that
Congress directed the FCC to auction off licenses to use certain wavelengths of
energy that exist in the air naturally and had previously been used by TV
broadcasters: "The 700 MHz auction was designed to sell off licenses to valuable
beachfront spectrum that television broadcasters have been forced to
relinquish.").
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Lost in a Struggle Between Liberalism and Libertarianism
Before western law recognized personal property,
feudalistic society only recognized property owned by the king.
Feudalism was in many ways characterized as a great villain by
enlightenment thinkers.201 The failure of feudalism to recognize the
citizenry’s natural freedom and equality of class justified not only
broad, but absolute rights to personal property in physical things.202
The dual goals of freedom and equality joined because of a
common enemy. Since then, many attempts at casting new villains
in our collective American property story to gather political ground
have been raised.203 However, none of these new villains have been
able to unify the interests of the people the way the enlightenment’s
rally against feudalism facilitated the overthrow of many western
kingdoms, including the overthrow of England in the Americas.204
201

Letter From John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, in 9 THE WORKS
JOHN ADAMS supra note 6, at 375–78 ("the only moral foundation of
government is, the consent of the people"); Grey, supra note 60 (These thinkers
included Blackstone, Hegel, Adams, Jefferson, Locke and the French and
American Revolutionaries. "[T]he concept of property as thing-ownership served
important ideological functions. Liberalism was the ideology of the attack on
feudalism.").
202
Grey, supra note 60 ("[P]roperty conceived as the control of apiece of the
material world by a single individual meant freedom and equality of status.").
203
Grey, supra note 60; William H. Taft, The Right of Private Property, 3 MICH.
L.J. 215, 233 (1894) (calling for lawyers to rise up and protect property owners
against the enflamed and more powerful working class that would otherwise
bring the evils of socialism and communism to the U.S.); Joseph William Singer,
The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 646 (1988) [hereinafter
Singer I] (calling for property reform based on the destructive actions of property
owners and evil corporations that undermined the free market).
204
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness. . . . But when a long train of abuses and
usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them
under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."); Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) ("The institution called
OF
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It would not have been possible to create the broadly accepted
convictions necessary to carry out a revolution without the
assurances of both liberty from the government and equality of
class as a result. In fact, the convictions about “equal liberty” held
by the framers, often took shape in discussions over property
ownership.205
The role of recognizing private property as an essential
component to securing freedom and equality quickly settled into a
debate that carries on in today’s politics.206 Libertarians and
Liberals hold opposite positions over how to conceive of property
based on whether freedom or equality is more important.207
Libertarians maintain that minimizing the government will
maximize freedom, and have argued freedom should be prioritized
above securing equality.208 Conversely, Liberals argue that
government regulation should be used to secure equality, and that

property guards the troubled boundary between individual man and the state. It is
not the only guardian; many other institutions, laws, and practices serve as well.
But in a society that chiefly values material well-being, the power to control a
particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation of individuality.").
205
Letter From John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, in 9 THE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS supra note 6, at 375–78.
206
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property Revisited, 7
UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 112, 116 (2011) [hereinafter Singer II] ("The
defining characteristic of American property law is the abolition of feudalism.").
Note that Freedom is "negative" freedom from government control and not a
positive conception of freedom to. Taft, supra note 203, at 218 ("[W]e inherited
from our English ancestors the deep seated conviction that security of property
and contract and liberty of the individual are indissolubly linked. . . . The
freedom of the citizen is secure. It is the right of private property that now needs
supporters and protectors.").
207
Taft, supra note 203, at 218(holding up the villains of anarchy, socialism, and
communism to justify high protection of individual and corporate property
because it turns individual greed into public benefit).
208
Id. at 233 (commenting on property as a "bulwark of freedom."). Cf. RAND,
supra note 4, at 481 ("I do not seek the good of others as a sanction for my right
to exist, nor do I recognize the good of others as a justification for their seizure of
my property or their destruction of my life." Eventually Rand's characters
compare the public good to "human sacrifices.").
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any cost to freedom for the cause of equality is worth it.209 It seems
that the legal discourse about property has devolved into how this
liberty-equality disagreement interacts with our fundamental rights
to “life, liberty and property.”210
This article treats a big versus small government
conversation as useless. In fact, it is a distraction. The big/small
government conversation sheds little truth on the concept of
property because both Libertarian and Liberal movements seem to
be interested in maximizing property.211 The ends justify the means
209

Singer I, supra note 203, at 690–91. Cf. FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 5
(Painting a more aristocratic and idle picture of wealthy, upper-crust Americans:
"The Carraways are something of a clan, and we have a tradition that we're
descended from the Dukes of Buccleuch, but the actual founder of my line was
my grandfather's brother, who came here in fifty-one, sent a substitute to the
Civil War, and started the wholesale hardware business that my father carries on
to-day.").
210
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring due process before a government
deprives someone of their "life, liberty, or property"); JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, ch. II, § 131 (1631) (Claiming that men "give up
the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature" to
"preserve himself, his liberty and property" and thus "the power of the society, or
legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the
common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against
those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and
uneasy."). Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53–55 (1905)
(expanding the Fourteenth Amendment, "life, liberty and property" to invalidate
state law that infringes on the individual's right to contract), with Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (Also expanding the Fourteenth Amendment,
"life, liberty and property," to expand state law, and deciding Fourteenth
Amendment rights include welfare in its capacity to "help bring within the reach
of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate
meaningfully in the life of the community.").
211
Taft, supra note 203, at 231 ("the institution of private property is what has
led to the accumulation of capital in the world. . . . Without it the whole world
would still be groping in the darkness of the tribe or commune stage of
civilization with alternating periods of starvation and plenty, and no happiness by
of gorging unrestrained appetite."); Lemley, supra note 22, at 1035–36 ("both
advocates and critics of antitrust enforcement have adopted the maxim that
intellectual property is just like any other form of property, though they draw
different conclusions from that assumption") (comparing U.S. Dep't of Justice
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and the result is a vacuum in discussion about what the ends of
society and government in fact are.212 Both Liberals and
Libertarians have been known to raise disingenuous caricatures of
the other side, not unlike the anti-feudalism sentiments at our
roots.213 Progressives have even been known to characterize the
Liberal/Libertarian rhetoric as a “phase” in our journey toward
ever-deepening modernity.214 However, our conception should not

and Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property § 2.2 (1995), with Hon. Giles S. Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants of
Monopoly?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 239 (1993)).
212
Compare Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, Berlin, I, 31 (1958) in
ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969) (concluding that accepting
pluralism of values that inform our definition of liberty and equality would be a
"truer" approach than "faith in a single criterion."), with LOCKE, supra note 210
at ch. II, § 9 ("I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men;
but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me by what right any prince
or state can put to death or punish any alien for any crime he commits in their
country." Thus, if not by applying some monist principal that actually endeavors
to justify the ends of an approach, the social contract cannot be legitimate) and
G.K. CHESTERTON, HERATICS, 16 (1905) ("Suppose that a great commotion
arises in the street about something, let us say a lamp-post, which many
influential persons desire to tear down. A grey-clad monk, who is the spirit of the
Middle Ages, is approached upon the matter, and begins to say, in the arid
manner of the Schoolmen, 'Let us first of all consider, my brethren, the value of
Light. If Light be in itself good—.' At this point he is somewhat excusably
knocked down. All the people make a rush for the lamp-post, the lamp-post is
down in ten minutes, and they go about congratulating each other on their
unmedieval practicality. . . . gradually and inevitably, today, tomorrow, or the
next day, there comes back the conviction that the monk was right after all, and
that all depends on what is the philosophy of Light. Only what we might have
discussed under the gas-lamp, we now must discuss in the dark.”).
213
Compare Taft, supra note 203, at 232 ("The sovereign today is the people, or
the majority of people. The poor are the majority. The appeal of the rich to the
constitution and courts for protection is still an appeal by the weak against the
unjust aggressions of the strong.") (quoting Citizens' Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. City
of Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 658 (1874), saying that forcing tax laws to serve the
public interest could in fact be a tyranny of the majority), with Singer I, supra
note 203, at 646, and Singer II, supra note 206, at 112, 114–15 ("I must admit
that my argument [in Singer I] was more utopian than realistic.").
214
Grey, supra note 60.
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be based on political and disingenuous caricatures that easily fall
into straw man,215 and false alternatives fallacies.216 These fallacies
highlight the importance of the natural law and state of nature
arguments proposed by enlightenment thinkers.217 Modern scholars,
who either marginalize or mischaracterize the role of natural law
and deductive reasoning as old hat, risk falling into nonsense.218
Nevertheless, over the past century this seems to be where
politics is driving us. For example, Libertarians tend to see property
as a way for private interests to be reclaimed from the
government.219 In so doing they pressure the courts to strike state
215

Andrew Jay McClurg, Logical Fallacies and the Supreme Court: A Critical
Examination of Justice Rehnquist's Decisions in Criminal Procedure Cases, 59
U. COLO. L. REV. 741, 832 (1988). Compare Taft, supra note 203, at 222, (Taft
characterizes the poor as the strong aggressors taking the rich man’s property)
(citing City of Topeka, 87 U.S. at 832 (to bring attention to a tyranny of the
majority situation), with Singer II, supra note 206, at 114 (noting that Tea Party
libertarians are dedicated to dismantling the government to increase the
constitutional protection for the property of the rich and powerful).
216
See McClurg, supra note 215, at 805 (1988) (citing Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S.
213 (1983)). Compare Taft, supra note 203, at 222 ("It follows as a necessary
conclusion that to destroy the guarantees of property is a direct blow at the
interests of the working man. . . . Everything which tends to legitimately increase
the accumulation of wealth and its use for production will give each laborer
larger share of the joint result of capital and his labor."), with Singer I, supra note
203, at 638 (Singer argued that "the question [of ownership] is meaningless,"
trivializing the need to identify "ownership" when talking about property rights in
order to create a "reliance interest in property.” It "encompass[es] the full range
of social relationships, from relations among strangers, between neighbors,
among long-term contractual partners in the marketplace, among family members
and others in intimate relationships, and finally, between citizens and the
government." Singer argues for a "property shift" when these relationships split
up).
217
See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 210, at ch. II, § 131.
218
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971) (The effect of believing
Rawls' theory is unearned trust in government decision makers and the basis for
Justice as Fairness, though hopeful, is complete nonsense).
219
Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264, 1280–81 (6th Cir. 1980); Singer I, supra note 203, at 646 (noting that the
libertarian “free market” view consists of property being immune from the
government, advancing certain sort of chastisement of the poor for not making
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and federal law for unconstitutionally violating private property
rights.220 They might even support takings claims in non-existent
property that might have existed had the government acted
differently.221 In order to reach the Libertarian ideal of a minimized
government, Libertarians have tried to expand the concept of
property in order to put pressure on the courts to overturn laws that
may redistribute wealth away from property owners.222
Conversely, Liberals have tried to redefine property rights in
order to redistribute property to the working class and historically
disadvantaged classes.223 In so doing, they have argued for further
expansion of the bundle of property rights.224 Not only would
business owners hold property rights in businesses, but so would
the workers, the town where the business existed and possibly any
other person that had a “fluid relationship” with the business.225
They also put their trust in legislators to find the right balance to lay
claim to a truly egalitarian society.226 Unfortunately, those

themselves rich: “If people are unhappy they only have themselves to blame:
Wealth and power are there for the taking.”).
220
Taft, supra note 203, at 232.
221
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978).
222
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53–56 (1905).
223
See Singer I, supra note 203, at 750 (Singer himself is an avowed Liberal and
advocates this).
224
Id. (arguing for a "reliance interest" in property); Singer II, supra note 206, at
114–15 (citing Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183)
(noting that the libertarian justices on the Supreme Court has had an effect on
state law); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183 (2000)
(granting mobile home owners a right of first refusal when the landward wants to
sell their homes was a taking); Sunder, supra note 130, at 330 ("[N]ew theories of
property, from personhood to social relations, enhanced our ability to explain and
justify legal limits on property, even while they served to bolster some property
claimants, such as tenants.").
225
Singer I, supra note 203, at 652–53.
226
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 72 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("the public interests
imperatively demand that legislative enactments should be recognized and
enforced by the courts as embodying the will of the people, unless they are
plainly and palpably beyond all question in violation of the fundamental law of
the Constitution.") (quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903)). See also
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legislators have actually advanced corporate interests, posturing
their causes to be in the name of the poor, blue-collar workers and
minorities.227 As a result of the near complete corporate capture of
Congress,228 the concept of property has been driven to extreme
maximization that only a psychopath would find reasonable.229
This discussion has continued in the IP field as well. Some
have argued for the application of absolute and maximum property
protection to IP, as if it were physical property.230 Others have
proposed the adoption of official workarounds of the Constitutional
limits on copyright.231 Some have proposed the adoption of moral
rights.232 Still others have argued that the application of a utilitarian
Singer II, supra note 206, at 114–15 (voicing a preference that state laws
recognizing tenant property interests should not be struck down by courts).
227
Paul Buchheit, The Corporate Betrayal of America, THE CONTRIBUTOR
(April 8, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://thecontributor.com/opinion/corporate-betrayalamerica.
228
Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 532 (2000)
(“[I]t is far too easy for Congress to fall into a pattern of responding to private
demands, rather than thinking proactively about what should be done. To a
disturbing extent, Congress . . . seems to have abdicated its role in setting
intellectual property policy to the private interests who appear before it."). See
also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860–61 (1987) ("[T]he [copyright] statute's legislative
history is troubling because it reveals that most of the statutory language was not
drafted by members of Congress or their staffs at all. Instead, the language [of the
1976 Copyright Act] evolved through a process of negotiation among authors,
publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the property rights the
statute defines."); Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future,
46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 193–94 (2003) (noting that copyright, once a right, at
some point crossed over became an entire regulatory regime).
229
See generally Ian B. Lee, Is There A Cure for Corporate "Psychopathy"?, 42
AM. BUS. L.J. 65 (2005) (commenting and legitimizing the indictment of
corporate behavior as psychopathic).
230
Epstein, supra note 17, at 455, 482, 520.
231
Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 517–18.
232
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
363 n.314 (1988) (citing Roberta Kwall, Copyright & the Moral Right: Is an
American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L REV. 1, 69 (1985)) ("Protection for
creators' personal rights . . . enables society to preserve the integrity of its cultural
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analysis should not simply assume “goodness” in the maximization
of creative output.233 At least one scholar has suggested that IP’s
economic underpinnings should be balanced with cultural
considerations instead of just relying on the marketplace to decide
what is best for IP.234
In fact, there has been a direct collision of the property
concepts underpinning the expansion of IP rights worldwide with
culture and identity.235 Over the last century identity politics have
been used by disadvantaged communities to defend and monetize
their culture.236 For example, a New Mexican tribe has sued New
Mexico for using its cultural symbol on the state’s flag without
authorization.237 They had demanded a million dollars for every
year since New Mexico chose its current state flag, which came to
74 million dollars. Moreover, accusations by minority activists
using the property term of art “cultural appropriation” is increasing.
For instance, Miley Cyrus was accused of cultural appropriation of
African American culture after her recent performance on the
VMA’s.238 Nike pulled a line of women’s exercise clothing because
it was accused of cultural appropriation for using exclusively male

heritage. The public's right to enjoy the fruits of a creator's labors in original form
and to learn cultural heritage from such creations has no time limit.").
233
Sunder, supra note 130, at 283–84 ("At times, utility in the intellectual
property context is defined simply as the maximization of creative output. The
goal then becomes creating the greatest number of cultural artifacts to be trickled
down to the greatest number of people.").
234
Id. at 268–69.
235
MARILYN
STRATHERN,
PROPERTY,
SUBSTANCE
&
EFFECT:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ESSAYS ON PERSONS AND THINGS 134, 163 (Athlone Press,
1999) ("Late 20th Century cultural politics makes it impossible to separate issues
of identity from claims to the ownership of resources.").
236
See Sunder, supra note 130, at 270–71 (noting a number of groups claiming
property rights to cultural property that they claim has been or could be
misappropriated without their permission).
237
Id.
238
Hadley Freeman, Miley Cyrus’s Twerking Routine was Cultural
Appropriation at its Worst, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2013, 12:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/27/miley-cyrus-twerkingcultural-appropriation.
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tattoos from Polynesia to inspire the clothing design.239 Similarly,
Forever 21 pulled a line of clothing after a high number of Twitter
posts criticized it for cultural appropriation.240 Some concerned
person might ask whether allowing the concept of property to
facilitate the commoditization of cultural identity is going too far.
Property maximalists might respond with realism: that
property as “thing” ownership itself was always a legal fiction
anyway.241 But it would be disingenuous to stop there and allow
this to be the final say. Realism would also conclude that there are
limits to expanding the concept of property. One could be the
“popular mind[‘s]” ability to comprehend a property claim as thing
ownership.242 This could be recast as a limit against genuine
dishonesty about property that the average taxpaying American
would see as incomprehensible.243 At its broadest stroke, realism
can only give credence to property claims that are not
unconstitutional and that do not put undue pressure on the
judiciary.244
—Blackstone recognized that all property was necessarily
physical and absolute.245 In other words, there was no such thing as
239

Vaimoana Tapaleao, Nike Commits Cultural Faux Pas, THE NEW ZEALAND
HERALD (Aug. 14, 2013, 5:30 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/
article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10912088.
240
Alexis Kleinman, Forever 21 Apparently has Pulled its Controversial
Compton Shirts, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2013) available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/25/forever-21compton_n_3988643.html.
241
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 332.
242
Grey, supra note 60.
243
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 12 (2013) (favoring "simplicity and
coherence" by refusing to allow American copyright law to continue
underwriting multiple streams of commerce worldwide).
244
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 72 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("the public interests
imperatively demand that legislative enactments should be recognized and
enforced by the courts as embodying the will of the people, unless they are
plainly and palpably beyond all question in violation of the fundamental law of
the Constitution.") (quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903)).
245
Id.
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intangible, limited property. This way property itself would be
clearly defined and not limited by the government. Also, property
would actually be connected to a physical “thing,” whose existence
itself was not necessarily dependent on the market or politics. This
conception of property as thing-ownership is not only clear; it is
also what the framers were thinking of when they put property into
our Constitution.246
In 1913, Hohfeld proposed the adoption of a positivist
conception of property.247 The positivists conceived of property as
anything from which value could be derived.248 Scholars in turn
began to refer to Hohfeld’s conception of property as the “new
property.”249 However, the Brandeis-Holmes minority view at that
time noted that positivism was not a new idea and thus its general
acceptance by law makers was the only “new” thing about it.250 In
246

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92.
247
Hohfeld I, supra note 13, at 19; Hohfeld II, supra note 13, at 712–13.
248
Hohfeld I, supra note 13, at 58 (Hohfeld based his conception on eight legal
relations that he claimed were "the lowest common denominators of the law"
basically allowing any legal relationship to be expressed as property. The eight
legal relations are rights, duties, privileges, no rights, powers, liabilities,
immunities and disabilities.).
249
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 361.
250
Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money
and labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to
ensure to it this legal attribute of property. The general rule of law is, that the
noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions and
ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to
common use. Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute of property is
continued after such communication only in certain classes of cases where public
policy has seemed to demand it."). Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Property,
a creation of law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable—a matter of
fact. Many exchangeable values may be destroyed intentionally without
compensation. Property depends upon exclusion by a law from interference.");
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A] Constitution is
not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and
the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made for
people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain
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fact, “the all-absorbing legal conception of the [19th] Century [was]
that of the property right. Everything was thought of in terms of
property.”251 Nevertheless, Hohfeld’s “new” property seemed to
have allowed lawmakers to break free of Blackstone’s requirement
that property be physical. In fact, scholars have noted that Hohfeld
characterized Blackstone’s conception of property to be an
“obsession with things.”252 Positivists also proposed that property
was not to be absolute or fixed. In Hohfeld’s words: “Since all legal
interests are ‘incorporeal’―consisting, as they do, of more or less
limited aggregates of abstract legal relations—such a supposed
contrast as that sought to be drawn by Blackstone can but serve to
mislead.”253 Complete acceptance of a Hohfeldian concept of
property happened when the American Law Institute’s Restatement
of Property in 1936 included Hohfeld’s eight legal relations as the
elements and correlatives of property instead of a definition of
property. These elements and correlatives included potentially
every valuable interest.254

opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with
the Constitution of the United States."). See also Vandevelde, supra note 13, at
333–34 (discussing an expansion of dephysicalized property in the nineteenth
century). But see Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell State Trial 1029, 1066 (K.B.
1765) (“[T]he eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.”); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (adopting the English view).
251
Dean G. Acheson, Book Note, 33 HARV. L. REV. 329, 330 (1919) (reviewing
MALCOLM H. LAUCHHEIMER, THE LABOR LAW OF MARYLAND BY MALCOLM H.
LAUCHHEIMER. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL
SCIENCE. SERIES XXXVII, NO. 2. BALTIMORE: JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS. PP. 163
(1919)) (including: "reputation, privacy, domestic relations, and as new interests
called for protection their success depended upon their ability to take on the
protective coloring of property.").
252
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 360.
253
Hohfeld I, supra note 13, at 24.
254
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 330 (By the beginning of the twentieth
century, the Blackstonian conception of property was no longer credible. A new
conception emerged and was stated in its definitive form by Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld. This new property was defined as a set of legal relations among persons.
Property was no longer defined as dominion over only physical things.).
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As positivism began to run its course, critics lambasted the
Hohfeldian conception because it threatened to render “property”
itself meaningless. If all legal relations were given the attribution of
property, then property “could no longer serve to distinguish one set
of legal relations from another.”255 It also would no longer prescribe
a degree of protection for different types of legal relations.256 The
resulting broad legal acceptance of the “dephysicalization of
property” expanded property law exponentially.257 It seemed that
property law was to become all encompassing.258 Swayze correctly
guessed that business goodwill, trademarks, common law copyright,
going value of businesses, franchises, and equitable easements
would finally be included within the ambit of “property.”259 Still,
mainstream legal thought resisted these critiques in the misguided
belief that intangible property would remain limited, by not
including the Blackstonian absolutist bundle of rights.260 However,
clear limits to modern property law have not yet been implemented
and many intangible right owners have only pushed for the highest
protection of intangibles as if they were tangible.261
In fact, as a result of positivism’s apparent success Grey
declared the disintegration of property itself.262 “The dissolution of
the traditional conception of property erode[d] the moral basis of
capitalism.”263 Thus Grey proposed that social evolution explained
that in our country’s current developmental phase the old ethical

255

Id. at 362.
Id.
257
Id. at 359–61.
258
Id. at 329 ("Any valuable interest potentially could be declared the object of
property rights.").
259
Francis J. Swayze, The Growing Law, 25 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1915).
260
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 340–57 (however, admitting that trademarks
were recognized to be absolute rights because of their necessary connection with
physical property in In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 89 (1879) that extend
everywhere).
261
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
262
Grey, supra note 60.
263
Id.
256
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justifications for our property system are no longer needed.264 Grey
saw the problem clearly: that positivism had generally reduced
property to an issue of politics.265 However, his comfort with a
concept of property that is neither ethically nor morally justified is
disturbing and general acceptance of such a system would be
absolutely inappropriate.266
It seems that after nearly a century of being declared
obsolete,267 the marketplace still indicates that Blackstone is
relevant. Take the price of gold for example.268 Historically, in
times of economic uncertainty consumers have literally stopped
trading intangibles like stock and actually bought up large amounts
of physical property. This phenomenon explains why the price of
gold soared in the wake of the 1930’s stock market crash, the 9/11
terrorist attacks, the dot.com bubble, and the 2008 mortgage
crisis.269 Thus, common sense or at least human instinct recognized
264

Id. ("Modern capitalist property must be seen as a web of state-enforced
relations of entitlement and duty between persons.").
265
Id.
266
See, e.g., SIR WILLIAM DAVID ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1877)
(presenting a moral deontological theory based on relationships which might fit
the social relations conception of property better than simply no moral
underpinning).
267
Vandevelde, supra note 13, at 359 (noting that Blackstone was rendered
obsolete because of his physicalism and absolutism).
268
Gold Prices as it Relates to the Global Economy, ITM TRADING,
http://www.itmtrading.com/gold_global_economy/ (last visited March 27, 2013)
("Gold is considered an asset more than an investment as you have physical
ownership of it . . . .") (italics added); Jacob Goldstein & David Kestenbaum, A
Chemist Explains Why Gold Beat Out Lithium, Osmium, Einsteinium . . . . NPR
(Nov. 19, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/02/15/
131430755/a-chemist-explains-why-gold-beat-out-lithium-osmium-einsteinium
(explaining that Gold and Silver are the only elements in enough abundance to be
traded that are not a gas, and that doesn't corrode or burst into flames and doesn't
kill you).
269
Jacob Goldstein, The Gold Bubble Is 4,000 Years Old, And It Won't End
Now, NPR (Apr. 15, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/
04/15/177340213/the-gold-bubble-is-4-000-years-old-and-it-wont-end-now
(noting that Gold demand boomed during the dot.com crash and the housing
crisis); Floyd Norris & Jonathan Fuerbringer, A DAY OF TERROR: THE
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that tangible property is more stable than intangible property.270
Grey noted that the concept of property in “the popular mind” can
limit the extent lawmakers are willing to extend property rights to
intangibles.271 Even if we are to fully accept positivism, property
reification into something “thing-like,” that average commonsense
citizens can accept as property, still matters to our legal analysis.272
In fact, there are “dozens of gold-backed digital currencies” in
existence today including GoldMoney and Pecunix.273 Bitcoin, a
more popularly known digital currency is not gold-backed but
claims to be inflation-resistant because there are a fixed number of
Bitcoins in existence.274 These digital currencies are traded by
people that may not trust the U.S. dollar that is subject to inflation
and fluctuation due to decisions made by a central banking system.
Digital currencies exist in a grey market partly because the U.S.
government has a constitutional monopoly on minting currency.275
However, digital currencies have not yet been subjected to a
government crackdown, and in fact may be protected by copyright

MARKETS; Stocks Tumble Abroad; Exchanges in New York Never Opened for
the Day, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/
09/12/business/day-terror-markets-stocks-tumble-abroad-exchanges-new-yorknever-opened-for-day.html (noting that gold and crude oil prices leaped after the
9/11 attacks); Casey Research, How do Gold Stocks Perform in a Depression?,
INFLATIONDATA.COM (June 5, 2009), http://inflationdata.com/articles/2009/
06/05/how-do-gold-stocks-perform-in-a-depression (noting that gold stocks didn't
drop during the great depression).
270
Grey, supra note 60 (In the face of positivism, "[m]ost people [still]
. . . conceive of property as things that are owned by persons.").
271
Grey, supra note 60 (when commenting on Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), "The kind of property that can be taken is
confined to those conglomerations of rights that, in the popular mind, have been
reified into 'things' or 'pieces of property.'").
272
Id.
273
Grinberg, supra note 107, at 174 (noting gold-backed digital currencies like
Pecunix and GoldMoney compete with non-backed digital currencies like
Bitcoin).
274
Id.
275
U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 8, 10.
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law.276 Some digital currencies have been criticized as a means to
avoid law enforcement for everything from tax evasion and
securities fraud to paying for drugs and hit men.277 Others defend
digital currencies as a commodity itself.278 As one spectator said:
“A Bitcoin is something that simply exists like gold. . . . Of course,
it’s not entirely like gold because it also, well, doesn’t [physically
exist].”279
Similarly, IP strategists have campaigned tirelessly to
convince Americans that copyright is also like gold in that
infringement is piracy and that file sharing is stealing. If a
significant base of average commonsense Americans accepts a
concept of absolute intangible property rights, major content
owners could win ever-increasing protections to their copyrights,
patents, trademarks, trade secrets and publicity rights.280 In fact,
stock prices and the going value of businesses are currently being
276

Compare MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th
Cir. 2010) opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, No. 09-15932,
2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011) (This case protected Blizzard's right to
manage its video game's online virtual economy and currency which can be
bought and sold for real money and valuated in terms of U.S. dollars), with
Grinberg, supra note 107, at 174 (describing many online currencies that exist in
a grey market and may eventually be found illegal for a number of reasons
including tax evasion and counterfeiting).
277
Alex Konrad, Feds Say They’ve Arrested ‘Dread Pirate Roberts,’ Shut Down
His Black Market ‘The Silk Road,’ FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013, 12:08 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2013/10/02/feds-shut-down-silk-roadowner-known-as-dread-pirate-roberts-arrested/.
278
Sean Vitka, Bitcoin: I’m Not Dead Yet!, SLATE (Oct. 16, 2013, 4:45 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/10/silk_road_shutdo
wn_does_not_spell_the_end_for_bitcoin.html.
279
Hugo Rifkind, How Bitcoin Could Destroy the State (And Perhaps Make me
a Bit of Money), THE SPECTATOR (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.spectator.co.uk/
columnists/hugo-rifkind/8874321/how-bitcoin-could-destroy-the-state-andperhaps-make-me-a-bit-of-money/.
280
H.R. REP. NO. 112-128, at 21 (2012) (Patent owners "need protection in
Europe, they need protection in China, they need protection in Korea and Japan
and other parts of Asia. And to do that, they are incredibly hampered by patent
systems that are totally misaligned. The AIA [America Invents Act] creates a new
gold standard for patent systems that has been the U.S. system.") (italics added).
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inflated by these intangibles which can have a negative effect on
pensions and innocent purchasers of intangibles that have no
tangible property backing. When suspect contracts involving
intangible property had fallen under the purview of the Court, as
pay-for-delay contracts recently have, the interested parties have
told the Court to look the other way.281
Furthermore, public outcry has stifled the growth of
government protection of IP rights.282 Thus, it seems that the
commonsense American layperson had not been tracking the
government’s gradual expansion of intangible property rights.
Positioned as a modern and progressive trend, property concepts
have been applied to entitlements,283 the IP field, human rights, in
personam rights, contract rights, bodily security, liberty and life
itself.284 The public will not accept all these property interests as
legitimate, and may reject some property rights as immoral.285 This
281

Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
23-24, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416)
2013 WL 836946; Hazen, supra note 10, at 795 (1987); Friedman, supra note 16,
at 636; Hirschler, supra note 14.
282
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
283
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970); Reich, supra note 204, at 785–
86 (arguing that property exists to serve security and independence and since
entitlements have been used to protect these values in modern times, entitlements
should also be included in the new property: "The presumption should be that the
professional man will keep his license, and the welfare recipient his pension.").
284
Grey, supra note 60 ("[M]ost property in a modern capitalist economy is
intangible. Consider the commercial paper, bank accounts, insurance policies—
not to mention more arcane intangibles such as trademarks, patents, copyrights,
franchises, and business goodwill."); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) ("life itself will be decided on the basis of
'might makes right.'"). See Bowman v. Monsanto Co. No. 11-796, slip op. at 1
(U.S. May 13, 2013) (deciding that a farmer is liable for patent infringement if
soybeans that have patented DNA reproduce naturally).
285
Clinton, supra note 22, at 20 (noting that many corporate supply chains have
been found to have been tainted with slavery, also noting that an estimated 20.9
million modern slaves exist today and that it constitutes an estimated $20 billion
dollar industry globally). See also Obama, supra note 22 (President Obama said
that "[i]t ought to concern every person, because it's a debasement of our
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has become clear as intangibles have threatened the public’s
economic and speech interests,286 and physical property rights
themselves.287 The People may declare these rights disingenuous
and dishonest for being nonphysical and completely un-thing-like.
Therefore, the judiciary should return to Blackstone’s
definition of property as necessarily physical property for purposes
of constitutional interpretation. The judiciary cannot continue to
entertain the positivist conception of property as anything from
which value can be derived because it fails to be constitutionally
sound. It fails because according to the positivist regime the
Copyright and Patent acts may be enacted entirely pursuant to the
interstate commerce power.288 Thus, positivism renders the
Copyright and Patent Clause superfluous and meaningless.
Accordingly, the limits expressed in the Copyright and Patent
Clause have been circumvented, eroding the traditional contours of
copyright. Despite this the Supreme Court had continued to rely on
these limits to ensure that IP rights do not impede the free speech
rights of the First Amendment.289
Furthermore, the utilitarian analysis inferred by courts into
the word “progress” in the Copyright and Patent Clause should be
considered a limit to the preemptory effect of copyright to state
granted rights inspired by privacy, tort or Hegelian personhood
theory. Margaret Radin has argued that we make a fundamental
common humanity. It ought to concern every community, because it tears at the
social fabric. It ought to concern every business, because it distorts markets. It
ought to concern every nation, because it endangers public health and fuels
violence and organized crime. I'm talking about the injustice, the outrage, of
human trafficking, which must be called by its true name—modern slavery. Our
fight against human trafficking is one of the great human rights causes of our
time and the United States will continue to lead it.").
286
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
287
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 21 (noting that a copyright in software
could even halt the sale of a used car).
288
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("Things in interstate commerce" and substantial effects tests).
289
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003) ("When, as in this case,
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further
First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.").
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moral distinction between fungible and personal property.290 She
also argued that fungible property, property that is held for its
exchange value, should be given less protection than personal
property, property that is held primarily because it is necessary to
our sense of self. However, the only kind of property recognized by
the Court’s current interpretation of the Copyright and Patent
Clause is “fungible.”291 Thus, property of the “personhood” type
should be left to the states to regulate.
The Courts should adopt a more serious conception of
public property to temper private property claims using Carol
Rose’s “comedy of the commons” rationale.292 Some property uses
work in the opposite direction from a “tragedy”293 when it is left to
public use including public roads, bridges and the Internet.294
Through custom, prescription and trust, the government has
recognized a public interest or right in some sorts of property that
constitute the “social glue” of a society.295 Rose noted that our
society’s social glue might be our right to free speech and the social

290

Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957–
60 (1982).
291
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
("In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a
marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.").
292
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986) [hereinafter
Rose: The Comedy].
293
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968)
(Negative externalities are the economic problem. Property rights internalize
those externalities by allowing private internalization of the some of the positive
externalities as well.).
294
Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 768 ("In a sense, this is the reverse of
the 'tragedy of the commons': it is a 'comedy of the commons,' as is so
felicitously expressed in the phrase, 'the more the merrier.'").
295
Id. at 778 ("[T]he Romans had a category of public property for religious
structures and places; this makes sense in a society that regards religions as a
'social glue' that holds the whole together.").
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activity brought about by commerce itself.296 In fact there is
compelling historical evidence that the First Amendment was
crafted to protect public goods.297 Finally, she noted the dangers of
failing to temper grants of private property with the public interest.
Rose’s concern was that in cases of holdouts and monopolies,
unreasonably high rents would be sought in the form of
prohibitively high prices. She noted that a cause for the higher rents
may have been brought about by the public’s participation, and not
the property owner’s personal investment in the property.298
To this end, intangible property claims should be subjected
to a strict ethical standard of honesty during creation, allocation and
valuation.299 This standard would require intangible property claims
296

Id. ("Perhaps an important social glue in our own society is free speech rather
than religion."). See also Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom, enacted on January 16, 1786, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at
347 (This bill was enacted by the Virginia General Assembly with the support of
James Madison. It vindicates religious and intellectual freedom and was one of
the sources that Congress drew upon when drafting the First Amendment in
1789, illustrating the symbiotic relationship freedom of speech and freedom of
religion in the United States.). Cf. Genesis 1:3 ("And God said, 'Let there be
light,' and there was light."); John 1:1, 14 ("In the beginning was the Word, and
the Word was with God, and the Word was God . . . . The Word became flesh and
made his dwelling among us."). For a Judeo-Christian society like the United
States, creation and authorship itself may clearly be seen as an act of free speech,
thus Rose's quip that our social glue might be free speech may not be as far from
the religious values that Ancient Rome based its public right on for the founders.
297
Roger Williams (1603–1683), A Plea for Religious Liberty, excerpt from THE
BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF CONSCIENCE (1644), available
at http://www.constitution.org/bcp/religlib.htm ("[I]t is the will and command of
God that (since the coming of his Son the Lord Jesus) a permission of the most
paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or antichristian consciences and worships, be granted
to all men in all nations and countries; and they are only to be fought against with
that sword which is only (in soul matters) able to conquer, to wit, the sword of
God's Spirit, the Word of God.").
298
Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 749–50.
299
Singer II, supra note 206, at 113–14 (Courts "have felt that companies are
'owned' by the shareholders and that the main purpose of a corporation is to
maximize profits. If that depends on shedding workers, so be it." However, "both
common law and statutory law impose minimum standards on all K relationships
to ensure contracting parties do not engage in fraudulent, deceptive or unfair
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to have a sufficient nexus with actual value backing that does not
simply arise from a “comedy of the commons.”300 If a property
claim were to fail this strict honesty standard, then the claim or
right would be stripped of the legal attribute of property. This
honesty standard could preserve efforts at the state level to regulate
fields of law that would otherwise have been swallowed by an overexpansive concept of property. Adopting these changes to the
concept of property is the most reasonable way to limit the
expansion of the Commerce Clause so as to protect the Copyright
and Patent Clause from being rendered meaningless.
Some may not believe that we need to enforce honesty in
the creation, allocation and valuation of intangible property.
However, in the name of the waning middle class of America, this
article disagrees vehemently. We are in the wake of a housing
crisis, a massive corporate buyout by the government, a resulting
world economic crisis and now an attitude that banks are not only
too big to fail but also too big to be held accountable. The
unabashed demand for maximized enforcement of IP rights
throughout the entire world has only recently been challenged by
public outcry and the Supreme Court.301 In response, the content
industry and internet service providers engage in self-help measures
by slowing or blocking the internet to individuals they perceive are
violating their economic interest in property rights.302 Such
measures are a direct violation of FCC net neutrality rules which

practices and to ensure that the relationship is subject to minimum standards
designed to recognize the dignity and humanity of the parties.").
300
Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 723; Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting
Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine 112 YALE L.J.
1179, 1182–83 (2003) (suggesting that public goods are in danger of waste by
way of underuse instead of waste by overuse. This conception could fit the
Comedy of the Commons idea into Lockean labor theory).
301
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
302
About the Center for Copyright Information, http://www.
copyrightinformation.org/about-cci/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (CCI is a
coalition of major copyright owner interest groups and ISPs, and they are
initiating copyright alert systems in violation of net neutrality).
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internet service providers are comfortable flouting,303 calling upon a
conception of copyright-as-property. Furthermore, many U.S.
Circuits validated the use of self-help measures by patent owners
who are granted an “almost unrebuttable presumption of patent
validity.”304 These trends indicate that the dangers to consumers, of
the unbridled and arbitrary grant of intangible property ownership,
is great and thus a higher standard of honesty in intangible property
ownership should be enforced.
Property Maximization, Public Outcry and the Constitution
[T]he current subprime crisis has made it abundantly
clear that the creation of a property right is not a
self-regarding act. The banking and mortgage
industries created & marketed subprime mortgages
which they then securitized and insured with credit
default swaps lacking any backing. When the
housing bubble burst, these property rights wrecked
the world economy.305
Despite this conclusion about the dangers of granting
property rights, Joseph William Singer embraced the classic Liberal
answer that recognizes yet more property rights in intangibles.306
However, his call for increased diversity in intangible property
rights through a social relations conception of property only

303

Preserving the Open Internet, 47 C.F.R. § 8 (2011).
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) ("First, we take
issue with the scope of the patent test's almost unrebuttable presumption of patent
validity."). See also Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 23-24, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223
(2013) (No. 12-416) 2013 WL 836946 (this issue is being heard by the U.S.
Supreme Court).
305
Singer II, supra note 206, at 114 (His solution, which is actually not apparent
to all, is to give the legislature a wider leeway to regulate: "It is apparent to all
that regulations of property are needed to prevent and respond to the externalities
associated with arrangements that are indifferent to the rights and needs of third
parties and to the nation as a whole.").
306
Singer I, supra note 203, at 742–43.
304

68

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 35:1

legitimizes the creation and marketing of destructive intangible
property in the first place. To stem the tides of the great injustice of
opportunism preying upon the middle class, lawmakers must
recognize the dishonest creation and marketing of intangible
property for what it is: a lie. Preserving the ability for businesses to
cloak lies in property in order to shift losses to the weaker classes is
destructive and purposeless.
Grey saw the problem perhaps in its most clear
form―disintegration.307 The problem became unavoidable when
we began recognizing intangibles as property. Short of
Blackstonian physicalism, there is no bright line to keep property a
“distinct legal category from other legal rights, in that they pertain
to things.”308 Grey said that this is true because “most property in a
modern capitalist economy is intangible.”309 What he did not
foresee was that lawmakers would begin to conceptualize
intangibles as “things” simply because they were given the attribute
of property and not because they are physical, or even detectable
with any of our five senses.310 Simply applied to constitutional law

307

Grey, supra note 60.
Id.
309
Id. ("Consider the common forms of wealth: shares of stock in corporations,
bonds, various kinds of commercial paper, bank accounts, insurance policies--not
to mention the arcane intangibles such as trademarks, patents, copyrights,
franchises and business good will.").
310
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1071 ("My worry is that the rhetoric of property
has a clear meaning in the minds of courts, lawyers, and commentators as 'things
that are owned by persons' and that fixed meaning will make it all too tempting to
fall into the trap of treating intellectual property as an absolute right to exclude.").
See also Grey, supra note 60; BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 74 (1967) (noting that perhaps it would be okay to call copyright
property as long as we think of property as a general concept); Stewart E. Sterk,
What's in a name? The Troublesome Analogies Between Real and Intellectual
Property, Cardozo Law Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 88, 43
(2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=575121 (arguing that "[i]t is far too late to
expunge the rhetoric of property from dialogue about copyright."); Carol M.
Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 631
(1998) [hereinafter Rose: Canons] (despotic dominion is a caricature of property
rights rather than an accurate description of them).
308
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before Sebelius, “things” in interstate commerce became all
encompassing. Thus, the effect of the positivist movement on
federalism, state sovereignty and human rights that were once seen
as free from federal limitation is nothing short of eclipsing.
There is ample historical evidence to conclude that robust
protection of intangible property does not result in the “substantial
direct effect[s] on economic growth” that enforcement of general
property rights do.311 Furthermore, granting overbroad IP rights
have been criticized for having the effect of incentivizing too much
investment into innovation as compared to “other forms of
production.”312 This “distort[ion of] the general economic

311

JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 92–93 (2008) ("The
historical evidence, the cross-country evidence, and the evidence from economic
experiments all point to a marked difference between the economic importance of
general property rights more generally. With the cross-country studies in
particular, the quality of general property rights institutions has a substantial
direct effect on economic growth. Using the same methodology and in the same
studies, intellectual property rights have at best only a weak and indirect effect on
economic growth . . . . [T]he empirical evidence strongly rejects simplistic
arguments that patents universally spur innovation and economic growth.
'Property' is not a ritual incantation that blesses the anointed with the fruits of
innovation; legislation of 'stronger' patent rights does not automatically mean
greater innovation. Instead, the effectiveness of patents as a form of property
depends critically on the institutions that implement the law. And there appear to
be important differences in the effectiveness of implementation across different
technologies and industries."). But see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 379
(2003) ("making intellectual property excludable creates value.").
312
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1064.
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equilibrium”313 may be seen best in the current business decisions
made by the telecommunications titan known as Comcast.314
In the past five years, Comcast has purchased
NBC/Universal, a company that creates and owns copyrighted
content, and established Xfinity, an Internet video distribution
company that competes with Hulu and Netflix.315 In fact, Comcast’s
subsidiary NBC was the sole distributor of the 2012 Olympics in
the United States.316 These projects represent tens of billions of
dollars devoted to the involvement of Comcast in copyright
ownership and distribution. Meanwhile, 30% of America is not
connected to the Internet at all, and only 8% has an updated fiber
optic connection.317 Everyone else is still connecting to the Internet
via copper wiring, and we are quickly losing the global race to high

313

Id. at 1062, 1064. See also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (1996); Brett M.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management,
89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 931 (2005) ("[E]conomic analysis of many infrastructure
resources fails to fully account for how the resources are used as inputs to create
social benefits and thus fails to fully account for the social demand for the
resources.").
314
Sam Gustin, Is Broadband Internet Access a Public Utility?, TIME (Jan. 9,
2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/09/is-broadband-internet-accessa-public-utility/ ("Because the U.S. government has allowed a small group of
giant, highly profitable companies to dominate the broadband market, Crawford
argues, American consumers have fewer choices for broadband service, at higher
prices but lower speeds, compared to dozens of other developed countries,
including throughout Europe and Asia."). See also Crawford, supra note 200
(“[T]he U.S. is rapidly losing the global race for high-speed connectivity, as
fewer than 8 percent of households have fiber service. And almost 30 percent of
the country still isn't connected to the internet at all . . . . All Americans need
high-speed access, just as they need water, clean air and electricity. But they have
allowed a naive belief in the power and beneficence of the free market to cloud
their vision. As things stand, the U.S. has the worst of both worlds: no
competition and no regulation.").
315
Gustin, supra note 314.
316
Id.
317
Crawford, supra note 200.
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speed Internet.318 In fact, because of Comcast’s lackluster
investment in the utility it oversees, some towns have rolled out
their own last mile fiber optic networks using public funds.319
The FCC’s net neutrality rules require transparency, no
blocking and no favoring of Internet traffic by internet providers.
Verizon has challenged these rules in the Federal Circuit.320
Without these rules nothing will stand in the way of
telecommunications companies becoming the largest beneficiaries
of copyright protection.321 Comcast has every incentive to and
318

Id. See also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 193 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("For in the absence of an effective
means of communication, the right to speak would ring hollow indeed. And, in
recognition of these principles, we have consistently held that the First
Amendment embodies, not only the abstract right to be free from censorship, but
also the right of an individual to utilize an appropriate and effective medium for
the expression of his views.").
319
See Crawford, supra note 200.
320
Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 14, 15, 50, 57, 75, Verizon v. Fed.
Commc’n Comm’n, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2013). See also FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FCC Grants Approval of Comcast-NBCU
Transaction (Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/transaction/
comcast-nbcu.html#orders (noting that FCC approval of the Comcast/NBC
merger was made on the condition that Comcast would fulfill a number of public
interest commitments including “Protecting the Development of Online
Competition.” Comcast/NBC’s exclusive grant of the copyright in the Olympics
arguably violates a number of these conditions including “unreasonably
withhold[ing] programming from Hulu.”); Who Owns the Media?, FREE PRESS,
http://www.freepress.net/ownership/chart (last visited on Dec. 2, 2013) (showing
the high consolidation of media industries).
321
Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 14, 15, 50, 57, 75, Verizon v. FCC, No. 111355 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2013). See also Marguerite Reardon, Franken: Comcast
Thumbs Nose at Net Neutrality Rules, CNET (May 7, 2012, 12:20 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57429373-38/franken-comcast-thumbsnose-at-net-neutrality-rules/ (noting that Comcast might be violating net
neutrality rules by exempting its Xfinity video service from monthly data caps).
But see Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990)
(finding that there is a copyright misuse defense inherent to copyright by
interpreting English common law history of copyright into U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8. This defense is rarely raised, even more rarely applied, and yet it is the
antitrust release valve for copyright).
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actively favors traffic in Xfinity’s favor.322 Since Comcast naturally
pays the exact minimum rate for connecting itself to the Internet, it
will be able to offer predatory prices to consumers for similar video
services provided by Netflix, Apple, Amazon and Google.323 The
chosen Trojan horse for Internet service providers like Comcast is
copyright because lawmakers have cloaked copyright in property so
well, even the Supreme Court has acknowledged it.324
IP’s complete transformation into a form of property is
partly due to an outright failure of courts to properly apply a
utilitarian economic analysis to IP rights.325 Because of the
difficulties in properly applying a utilitarian analysis, lawmakers
have fallen to their assumptions while couching those arguments in
utilitarian terms.326 Some rely on Locke, granting higher protection
to reward labor.327 Others lean on Mill’s marketplace of ideas,
limiting grants of IP according to the free-market.328 Thus, courts
322

Reardon, supra note 321.
See Tony Bradley, Comcast Toll on Netflix Screams for Net Neutrality, PC
WORLD (Nov. 30, 2010, 5:57 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/211964/
comcast_toll_on_netflix_screams_for_net_neutrality.html
(explaining
how
Comcast's non-neutral stance toward Netflix stems from its apparent moral
ground in blocking peer-to-peer file sharing services).
324
Grey, supra note 60 ("To own property is to have exclusive control over
something . . . Legal restraints on the free use of one's property are conceived as
departures from an ideal conception of full ownership."); United States v.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The [Copyright Clause]
grant [of legislative power] itself is stated in positive terms, and does not imply
any negative pregnant that suggests the term ‘writings’ operates as a ceiling on
Congress' ability to legislate pursuant to other grants. Extending quasi-copyright
protection also furthers the purpose of the Copyright Clause to promote progress
of the useful arts by securing some exclusive rights to the creative author.").
325
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1057 (noting that IP rights are justifiable only to
the extent that excludability does in fact create value necessary to incentivize
creation and innovation). See also Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A
Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 638 (2003) ("[T]he unauthorized use of another's
IP, unlike unauthorized use of another's physical property, lacks clear normative
significance.").
326
McGowan, supra note 147, at 2–3, 7, 38, 71–72.
327
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1066–67.
328
Id.
323
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fail to address what incentives are appropriate in order to spark
creation and innovation and have presented a smattering of
inconsistent and conflicting outcomes.329 This is an indication that
the current framework underpinning IP law is ineffective.
Two shortcomings of a legal utilitarian analysis have been
recognized by IP scholars. First, it is difficult to impossible to
define utility or even to determine which types of utility are
favored.330 This adds to the difficulty of applying a utilitarian
analysis. Second, it lacks a mechanism to encourage dissemination
of copyrighted and patented materials especially to women and the
poor.331 In fact, philosophical ethicists have long criticized Mill and
Bentham for merely supporting a form of Hedonism.332 Other
329

DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH
LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 135 (2000) (We have missed the boat, because
"what we want . . . is not merely an incentive but the right incentive."). See also
Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMM.
635, 638–39 (1996) ("'Sufficient incentive,' however, is something less than
'perfect control.' The question we must ask is what kind of control the Net should
yield to owners of intellectual property."); Lemley, supra note 22, at 1059
(enumerating the costs of overbroad grant of IP rights as: 1, IP rights distort
markets away from the competitive nom by creating static inefficiencies and
deadweight losses, 2, it interferes with other creators' to work (dynamic
inefficiencies), 3, it creates rent-seeking behavior that is socially wasteful, 4, they
have high administrative costs and 5, the cause overinvestment in research and
development itself that is distortionary). Cf. The Sony Bono Copyright Extension
Act 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (The retroactive provisions gave no new incentive to
authors to create and yet was not unconstitutional.).
330
Sunder, supra note 130, at 284. See also JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM, ch. 2 (referring to high and low pleasures, some being worth
more than others); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 5 (1974)
("Indeed, no proposed decision making criterion for choice under uncertainty
carries conviction here, nor does maximizing expected utility on the basis of such
frail probabilities.").
331
Sunder, supra note 130, at 284 (citing AMARTYA SEN, EQUALITY OF WHAT? in
CHOICE, WELFARE, AND MEASUREMENT 353, 354, 356 (1982)).
332
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed. 2012), http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/consequentialism/ ("Classic utilitarians
held hedonistic act consequentialism."); Andrew Moore, Hedonism, THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed. 2011),

74

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 35:1

critics have found utilitarianism hopelessly inapplicable and fatally
undefined.333 Sebelius could represent a necessary shift in
Constitutional interpretation for courts to adopt a more limited and
practicable underpinning for IP law.334 Utilitarianism may in fact be
unworkable. But unless and until the federal government recognizes
this, the power to regulate by more limited non-utilitarian
justifications should be left to the states.
The benefits gained from abandoning utilitarianism would
be felt on a worldwide level.335 Democracy could spread through
the Internet to the four corners of the earth. Democracy could
spread across the globe not through government propaganda or war,
but by the simple fact that everyone, regardless of class, can equally
express themselves online. In fact, other values that do not easily fit
into a utilitarian framework should be considered including

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/hedonism/
(noting
that
Bentham's utilitarianism was regarded as a "pig philosophy.").
333
See, e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 332 (For example, utilitarianism has
a hard time explaining why one must tell the truth, or otherwise not lie, if telling
the truth will cause the teller pain. Utilitarians claim that when there are no
negative factors against telling the truth, the theory requires one to tell the truth.
But even here, they cannot say why one should tell the truth if it does neither
generates nor costs utility to lie. Other criticisms include its failure to clearly
define the factors measured in a cost and benefit utility analysis.).
334
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2644.
335
Sunder, supra note 130, at 280 (The Internet facilitates a "semiotic
democracy" by handing us the tools of creation and dissemination). See also ERIC
VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 123–24 (2005) ("democratization of
the opportunity to create is important beyond giving more users the ability to
make exactly the right products for themselves . . . [T]he joy and the learning
associated with creativity and membership in creative communities is also
important, and these experiences too are made more widely available as
innovation is democratized."). But see China's Internet: A Giant Cage, supra note
136 (noting that the current Chinese government has been able to leverage
internet tools to actually further authoritarian interests); Nicole Perlroth, Hackers
in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 30,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinese-hackersinfiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html?pagewanted=all (Chinese hackers
actually cyberattacked the New York Times when they had published political
criticism of the Chinese government).
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individual autonomy, sovereign autonomy, culture, equality and
development.336 Values that we may take for granted in the U.S.
should not go unconsidered by TRIPs. Nor should they be lost on us
here at home.
In fact, the result of continuing to press a utilitarian,
maximized IP regime onto the world will not be higher profits for
western IP owners. It will actually end similar to the current
position of the U.S. in the world economy for merchandise. In
2001, President Clinton and Congress opened our markets with
China so that we could sell them products,337 and we actually ended
up having them sell us toothbrushes, pencils, knick-knacks, etc.338
As a result we are losing jobs and billions of dollars of our GDP
because of the lack of forethought that went into our trade
agreements with China. Now, one of the reasons we passed the
America Invents Act (AIA) was to meet China’s rise in patent
grants.339
336

Sunder, supra note 130, at 324–25.
Letter to Congress from President Clinton (May 23, 2000), available at
http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/05/2000-05-23-letter-from-the-president-tospeaker-hastert.html ("China—with more than a billion people—is home to the
largest potential market in the world. To enter the WTO, China has agreed to
open that market to everything from American wheat to cars to computers . . . If
Congress makes the right decision, our companies will be able to sell and
distribute products in China made by American workers on American soil,
without being forced to relocate manufacturing to China, or to sell through the
Chinese government, or to transfer valuable technology. We will be able to
export products without exporting jobs."); Press Release, WTO Successfully
Concludes Negotiations on China's Entry, WTO NEWS (Sept. 17, 2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm
(Most
of
the
agreement was focused on opening China's doors to American businesspeople
and investors, including in telecom. Not one politician seemed to guess that
market pressures would facilitate the near opposite result).
338
U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with China,
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, available at http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c5700.html (showing that the U.S. has only purchased more
Chinese goods every year, far surpassing our exports to China. In 2012 we
bought $315 billion more in Chinese goods than we exported to China).
339
Floor Statement of Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith, The
America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, (June 22, 2011), available at
337
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If we keep reacting to countries that do not believe in
equality, transparency or human rights in general we will lose our
higher ground not only economically but also ethically. Not only
will others’ upper classes be the greatest beneficiaries of our IP
laws,340 but our IP laws will also justify the silencing and
enslavement of their lower classes.341 As Wal-Mart has proven with
their record of predatory pricing,342 Main Street America cannot
compete with businesses that contract with countries that do not
believe in equality of class.343 EBay has already sold off a portion

http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/issues_patentreformact2011.html ("And while
America's innovators are forced to spend time and resources defending their
patents, our competitors are busy developing new products that expand their
businesses and their economies. According to a recent media report, China is
expected to surpass the United States for the first time this year as the world's
leading patent publisher."). See also Lee Chyen Yee, China tops U.S., Japan to
become top patent filer, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/12/21/us-china-patents-idUSTRE7BK0LQ20111221.
340
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 22-23 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Court embraces an international-exhaustion rule that could benefit U.S.
consumers but would likely disadvantage foreign holders of U.S. Copyrights.").
341
Clinton, supra note 22, at 20. See also Obama, supra note 22 ("It ought to
concern every person, because it's a debasement of our common humanity. It
ought to concern every community, because it tears at the social fabric. It ought
to concern every business, because it distorts markets. It ought to concern every
nation, because it endangers public health and fuels violence and organized
crime. I'm talking about the injustice, the outrage, of human trafficking, which
must be called by its true name—modern slavery. Our fight against human
trafficking is one of the great human rights causes of our time and the United
States will continue to lead it.").
342
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Am. Drugs, Inc., 319 Ark. 214, 234 (1995)
(ultimately ruling in favor of Wal-Mart, and deciding that selling goods below
market value was not predatory or illegal); Edmund L. Andrews, International
Business; Germany Says Wal-Mart Must Raise Prices, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept.
9, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/09/business/international-businessgermany-says-wal-mart-must-raise-prices.html; Wal-Mart to Sell 85 Stores in
Germany, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 29, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/
jul/29/business/fi-walmart29.
343
Sam Hornblower, Wal-Mart & China: A Joint Venture, FRONTLINE (Nov. 23,
2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/walmart/secrets/

Bringing America Back to the Future

77

of its company to Alibaba, a similar company that sells cheap
products direct from Chinese factories to western consumers.344 The
need for companies like Costco and Wal-Mart could be undermined
entirely by the development of international business models that
they pioneered.
Non-alienable termination rights may be perceived as a
safety-valve for unfairness traditionally found in entertainment
contracts of adhesion that make non-authors the beneficial owner of
copyrights.345 For instance, original authors of musical works can
reclaim their copyright “after thirty-five years (in some cases), after
fifty-six years (in other cases), and sometimes even after seventyfive years” have passed since the grant was first executed,346 as long
as it was executed on or after January 1, 1978.347 In this way major
musical hits can be reclaimed, like the Village People’s YMCA
song, which was reclaimed in 2012.348 However, termination rights
do nothing for those who transferred their copyright before 1978,349
wmchina.html; Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, The Origins and Social
Consequences of China's Hukou System, 139 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 644 (1994)
(Those who have a hukou in Beijing or Shanghai receive social benefits like
healthcare and welfare, while those in the countryside do not).
344
Alibaba.com Strengthens Position as Go-To Supply Source for U.S. Ecommerce Entrepreneurs with Acquisition of Auctiva, BUSINESS WIRE (Aug. 24,
2010), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100824006735/en. See also
Sayantani Ghosh & Aurindom Mukherjee, China's Alibaba Buys Back Half of
Yahoo's Stake, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2012, 4:02 PM) http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/09/18/us-alibaba-buyback-yahoo-idUSBRE88H0Y520120918
(if
Alibaba buys Yahoo!, they will be completely tapped into the American
consumer base).
345
17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2013).
346
Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the
"Inalienable" Right to Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329 (2010).
347
17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(3), 304 (2013).
348
Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11CV1557 BTM(RBB), 2012 WL
1598043 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012).
349
Don Snowden, Fighting for Artists' Publishing Rights, LOS ANGELES TIMES
(Mar.
1,
1987),
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-03-01/entertainment/ca6711_1_artists-rights (noting that Richard Berry reached an amicable settlement
for half of the publishing rights in the song Louie Louie after he had sold it for
$750 30 years earlier).
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and termination rights do not extend to works “made for hire.”350
Even though termination rights may help even out the balance
between starving artists and big business, TRIPs continues to leave
out lower and middle class rights holders from consideration
altogether.351
The failure of international IP law to capture the interests of
the lower and middle classes was masterfully illustrated in the 2013
Academy Award winning documentary Searching for Sugar
Man.352 American artist Sixto Rodriguez’s work rose to fame in
South Africa without him ever getting paid and without him ever
knowing until Rodriguez’s eldest daughter happened upon a
website dedicated to him in 1998. In South Africa his songs had
become the rally cry for Afrikaner apartheid protesters. For years,
record companies cut and sold his records sending royalties to the
record company that dropped Rodriguez after his records flopped in
the United States. Meanwhile, Rodriguez and his family returned to
their humble beginnings to live out their days in the rough
neighborhoods of Detroit.
What is more, TRIPs leverages IP regulation in developing
nations that haven’t embraced rights to property, security and
liberty regarding physical property.353 The resulting new regime
stifles the expansion of the “self-evident” truth that all men are
created equal.354 Along these lines, Doctors Without Borders

350

17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2013); Michael Cieply, Court Ruling Says Marvel
Holds Rights, Not an Artist, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 28, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/business/media/disney-wins-marvelcomics-copyright-case.html?_r=0 (Disney owns Marvel Comics).
351
Sunder, supra note 130, at 264-65 (noting that the composer of The Lion
Sleeps Tonight, never benefited economically from its use in Disney's The Lion
King).
352
About Rodriguez, Rodriguez Official Website, http://www.rodriguezmusic.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2013).
353
Sunder, supra note 130, at 291.
354
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness."). See also Zach Carter, WikiLeaks Reveals Secret
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reported that patent protection at the level TRIPs requires can
kill.355 Thus some developing countries are acting to limit TRIPs
patent protection to preserve human rights and life.356 In general,
developing countries are under pressure to adopt defensive IP
policies to protect “poor people’s knowledge.”357 This includes
traditional knowledge, geographical indications, and biodiversity.
Finally, Creative Commons offers a Developing Nations Creative
Commons License. This license is designed to allow third world
citizens to release artistic expression in the developing world
without also releasing their work in the developed world.358
Utilitarianism as a regime that reduces the conception of IP to a
matter of wealth maximization without considering the costs
tomorrow has stood in the way of these sorts of efforts to protect
the poor under classes of the world.
Abandoning utilitarianism would also create positive
benefits domestically. First, it would at the very least allow us to
limit the trend of commoditization and propertization of anything
from which value can be derived. Scholars have warned that the
current IP regime is a threat to free speech and the public
domain.359 IP could finally be aligned with the finding in State v.
Shack, that “[p]roperty rights serve human values.”360 The current
Obama Deal, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/13/wikileaks-global-health_n_4269337.html.
355
See also Zach Carter, WikiLeaks Reveals Secret Obama Deal, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/13/
wikileaks-global-health_n_4269337.html, Cf. Amicus Brief of Antitrust
Economists, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., No. 12-416, 2013 WL 836946
(U.S. Feb. 28, 2013); Hazen, supra note 10, at 795; Hirschler, supra note 14.
356
Sunder, supra note 130, at 291.
357
Id. at 298.
358
Id. at 288–89.
359
MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 90 (2003). See Golan v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012) (finding it constitutional for Congress to take
things that once fell into the public domain and returning them to foreign private
ownership according to international trade agreements under the Uruguay Round
Agreements).
360
State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 304 (1971) (finding that a landowner could not
"stand between the migrant workers and those who would aid them.").

80

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 35:1

trend of commoditization of culture already threatens local foreign
cultures, and could end with aspects of our identities (religious,
racial and cultural) bought and sold worldwide.361 If IP is a
worldwide “struggle over social relations” we must also count the
cost to our own culture if major content owners prevail in achieving
absolute global IP protection.362 As Professor Sunder has remarked:
In the Participation Age, people with access to a
computer and relatively cheap but powerful digital
hardware challenge the hegemony of traditional
cultural authorities and create new cultural meanings
from the bottom up. . . . Make no mistake:
intellectual property law is no mere bystander in this
culture war. It both empowers and disempowers
individuals and groups when recognizing (or
misrecognizing) authors and inventors, pirates and
thieves.363
Perhaps we do not need to analogize to property’s “pirates
and thieves”364 at all. We could just call IP law what it is, statutory
law.365 Those who do not follow the rules are what the statutes call
361

Sunder, supra note 130, at 275 (noting IP measures taken in India to protect
Indian candies made at a religious site and uniquely woven sarees). See also Zoe
Alsop, Pictures: China's Fake Disneyland, Overgrown and Ghostly, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 22, 2011), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
travelnews/2011/12/pictures/111222-china-fake-disneyland-disney-worldtravel/#close-modal (Someone actually tried to recreate America's main street,
the way Disneyland did, in China, and now Disney is opening a "legitimate"
theme park in Shanghai. That is our main street being flung out on the world
stage.).
362
Sunder, supra note 130, at 274–75.
363
Id. at 322–23.
364
Kaplan, supra note 310, at 74 ("[C]haracterization in grand terms then seems
of little value: we may as well go directly to the policies activating or justifying
the particular determinations.").
365
Compco v. Blue Crest [1980] S.C.R. 357, 372–73 (Can.) ("[C]opyright law is
neither tort law nor property law in classification, but is statutory law. It neither
cuts across existing rights in property or conduct nor falls in between rights and
obligations heretofore existing in common law. Copyright legislation simply
creates rights and obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances set out in
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them: infringers. However, in the U.S., this is unlikely because proregulation versus de-regulation is a highly politicized aspect of the
struggle between Libertarians and Liberals.366 The attribute of
property gives IP rights just the kind of natural rights legitimacy
that both Libertarians and Liberals seem to want. Imagine if we
leveraged poorer, less fortunate nations into adopting strict IP laws
for anything less.367 The reality is that we probably have. Some are
certainly dedicated to an IP-as-property-law regime simply because
it would be embarrassing to go back now. Justices Ginsberg,
Kennedy and Scalia in their joint dissent in Kirtsaeng seemed to
think it was an embarrassment to the American government to back
out of a maximized regime.368 However, the majority found that the
Constitution called for something more limited, and they had thus
avoided the more destructive and, as Jefferson recognized it,369

the statute."). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory
Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 335, 336–37 (2004) ("Anyone who does
not believe that the IP laws are a form of regulation has not read the [statutes] and
the maze of technical rules promulgated under them. . . . The range of
government estimation that goes on in the IP system is certainly as great as in
regulation of, say, retail electricity or telephone service.").
366
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1074 ("Regulation is out of vogue, and those who
talk about IP as regulation usually do so to denigrate it.") (citing Thomas B.
Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
272 (2004) ("In the end, 'exclusive rights' are merely another form of regulation
that Congress may, and frequently does, use to confer economic rents on favored
special interests.")).
367
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1074 ("the problem with the property story [is that]
it brings with it too much baggage"); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City,
383 U.S. 1, 8–9, n.2 (1966) ("Inventions . . . cannot, in nature, be a subject of
property.") (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13,
1813, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92 (Jefferson thought
giving inventions a limited, exclusive right was an embarrassment, and giving
inventions the attribute of property was an impossibility)).
368
Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
369
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813, in
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 1291–92 ("That ideas should freely
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of
man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and
benevolently designed by nature.").
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more embarrassing result of preserving a double standard of
freedom globally.370
There has been a lively discussion about what to call IP if
not property.371 Some are concerned that “it is all too common to
assume that because something is property, only private and not
public rights are implicated.”372 This is to call into question the
370

Compare Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("The
Court’s bold departure from Congress’ design is all the more stunning, for it
places the United States at the vanguard of the movement for 'international
exhaustion' of copyrights—a movement the United States has steadfastly resisted
on the world stage."), with Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Statement on
the U.S. Submission of Initial Input into the International Telecommunication
Union's World Conference on International Telecommunications (Aug. 3, 2012)
(noting a fight for "Internet freedom" against "some countries [that] restrict the
free flow of information online."), and Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC,
Prepared Remarks for the International Telecommunications Union Global
Symposium for Regulators in Beirut, Lebanon, ICT: Global Opportunities and
Challenges (Nov. 10, 2009) (touting the FCC's role to preserve a "free, open and
robust Internet" as an example to follow on the world stage).
371
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1074–75 ("My fear is that a focus on analogies will
mislead more than it enlightens. If there are sufficient dissimilarities between IP
and other areas of law, drawing analogies becomes problematic, not only because
of the caveats that are required ('IP is like any other tort, except in the following
ways . . . .'), but because those caveats have a way of getting lost over time. This
may be what has happened with efforts to talk about IP as a form of property:
over time, it is too easy to rely on the shorthand reference to property and come
to believe that IP really is like other kinds of property."); Tom W. Bell, Authors'
Welfare: Copyright As A Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 229, 235–67, 273–74 (2003); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in
Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1306 (1998); Wendy J. Gordon,
Copyright As Tort Law's Mirror Image: "Harms," "Benefits," and the Uses and
Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003); Bruce P. Keller,
Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other
Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 401, 402 (1998); A. Samuel Oddi, Product Simulation: From Tort to
Intellectual Property, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 107–08 (1998); KAPLAN, supra
note 310, at 74; Sterk, supra note 310, at 43. See also Rose: Canons, supra note
310, at 631.
372
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1071. But see Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing
Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 389 (2003) (noting a debate over
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traditional concept of patents and copyrights as grants of limited
monopoly in an otherwise public good. Public goods are nonrivalrous and non-excludable. The idea is that if we do not grant
some excludability in creative invention and expression, we will not
achieve the mandate of “progress” called for in the Copyright and
Patent Clause. However, once the attribute of property began
mixing with this conception of IP law, the question has been flipped
on its head. We went all the way from asking how limited we can
make the grant of these “monopolies” to how broadly we can
construe progress to grant ever-increasing “private property”
protection to IP rights.373
—The cost of allowing dishonesty in the marketplace to
continue in the area of intangibles is much greater than anyone
seems to realize. As our global economies continue to intertwine, it
is obvious that market failures can lead to global crisis. The current
property and IP regimes contributed to cycles of market failure by
allowing and encouraging widespread promises of value in
intangible property that may or may not exist. Then when the
pension, insurance or stock should pay out, there is little or nothing
there. These dead weight losses are most frequently endured by the
middle class.
There is hope. Unbeknownst to most property legal
scholars,374 the average American layperson still knows the
difference between physical property and intangible property. To
put it in context, the average American individual knows the
difference between a bar of gold and a promise from their employer
that they will receive the value of a bar of gold in company shares
whether "copyright law serves to protect certain essential private property
interests or whether copyright law is informed by public, regulatory values.").
373
Richard Craswell, How We Got This Way: Further Thoughts on Fuller and
Perdue, 1 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 12 (2001) (warning that thinking of
rights as property rights may "exert a sort of psychological force that makes some
remedies seem more plausible than others").
374
Grey, supra note 60 ("[T]he theory of property rights held by the modern
specialist tends both to dissolve the notion of ownership and to eliminate any
necessary connection between property rights and things.").
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after many years of faithful service. When they were forced to
default on a mortgage that was fatally structured for an economy
that only ever grew skyward, they kicked themselves and finally
remembered the story of Babel.375 Now with perfect hindsight, it is
shocking that any of us could have believed a lie that the housing
market only ever would increase in value. But most Americans did.
The housing market crisis represents the greatest redistribution of
wealth in our country and it was to the rich upper class. Introducing
new limits to the regulatory power of Congress and modifications to
our underlying concept of property are not only in order, but
according to Sebelius these changes are finally underway.
A Note about Bitcoin and Other Digital Currencies
Increasing trust in Bitcoin and other digital currencies
because they are gold-backed, inflation resistant or superior to
owning a U.S. dollar in any way should be an important signal to
law makers. Ever since we decided not to back our currency with
gold, favoring regulation through a centralized banking authority,
our currency has become worth as much as the U.S. government’s
word is worth.376 Thus, the success of our economic system rests on
375

Genesis 11:1–9; Yalman Onaran, Basel Becomes Babel as Conflicting Rules
Undermine Safety, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-03/basel-becomes-babel-as-conflicting-rulesundermine-safety.html (describing how the international banking rules make no
sense, noting that a $639 trillion dollar derivatives market has been forced in to
clearinghouses where transactions are backed by collateral). See also Bruce I.
Jacobs, Tumbling Tower of Babel: Subprime Securitization and the Credit Crisis,
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL, 17 (2009), http://top1000funds.com/
attachments/234_Tumbling%20Tower%20of%20Babel%20%20Subprime%20Securitization%20and%20the%20Credit%20Crisis.pdf.
376
Friedman, supra note 16, at 637–38 ("Traditional floats [of currencies] have
now become respectable." Calling the preserving of gold backing a high price for
a "trivial . . . gain." Also grounding his argument for debasing world currencies
and developing a futures market in the U.S. on the belief that "[e]xchange rates
will almost surely continue to be stated in terms of the dollar. In addition, the
U.S. has the largest stock in the world of liquid wealth on which the market can
draw for support. It has a legal structure and a financial stability that will attract
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the honesty of our government in the creation, allocation and
valuation of currency. Congress has generally trusted in Friedman
and others who blindly hoped that the free market would protect the
U.S. government from “errors” in the creation, allocation and
valuation of the U.S. dollar.377 This ultimately resulted in the U.S.
treasury and Standard and Poor’s having had a disagreement in
valuation within the trillions of dollars.378 Similarly, there is a
connection with errors in the creation, allocation and valuation of
intangible property that leads to astronomical dead weight losses
that are disproportionately endured by the American middle
class.379
PART III: RECLAIMING A PRINCIPLE OF HONESTY
Returning to requirements of honesty and truthfulness is the
appropriate answer to our recent market failures. History has long
held that the public has a right to an open and honest
marketplace.380 Every common American deserves a marketplace
where the rules are clearly presented and enforced. Deceitfulness

funds from abroad. It has a long tradition of free, open, and fair markets.");
STOCKMAN, supra note 3, at 5, 282–83, 290–91 ("Wall Street has become a vast
casino where leveraged speculation and rent seeking have displaced its vital
function of price discovery and capital allocation. The September 2008 financial
crisis, therefore, was about the need to drastically deflate the Wall Street
behemoths—that is, dangerous and unstable gambling houses—fostered by
decades of money printing and market rigging by the Fed. Yet policy veered in
the opposite direction, propping them up and thereby perpetuating their baleful
effects, owing to a predicate that was dead wrong.").
377
See David Corn, Alan Shrugged, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 23, 2008),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/10/alan-shrugged.
378
Katz & Del Giudice, supra note 36.
379
Tami Luhby, Why America's Middle Class is Losing Ground, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 5, 2013, 11:51 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/05/news/economy/
middle-class-wages/index.html. See generally, Szeltner et al, supra note 3.
380
BAKER, supra note 12, at 320. See also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *449.
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should not be read into a nature of some forms of property,381 and
the risks of trading in such property should not be foisted onto
purchasers as buyer’s remorse. This would undermine contract
law’s centuries old prohibition of “false purveyor[s].”382 Instead,
the courts should adopt honesty as a formality similar to the form of
“special case” which once removed an “unsatisfactory fiction,”
which equated non-forcible wrongs with wrongs committed with
“the force of arms.”383 Intangible property claims being defended as
if they are physical property is a similar unsatisfactory fiction.
Courts should reclaim the ability to nuance the formal judicial
consideration of intangibles so as to recognize the deceitful
creation, allocation and valuation of intangibles. After all,
establishing the truth is necessary to carrying out justice.384
In fact, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison so inspired
Congress to draft the First Amendment based on a vigorous defense
of religious and intellectual freedom adopted in the Virginia Act for
Religious Freedom.385 The conflict between the puritans and
381

Amicus Brief of Antitrust Economists, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc.,
No. 12-416, 2013 WL 836946, at *23-24 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2013); Hazen, supra note
10, at 795; Hirschler, supra note 14.
382
U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (2001) ("'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade.") (italics added); BAKER, supra note 12, at 278. See
Somerton v. Colles (1433), in C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE
COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 343 (1949).
383
BAKER, supra note 12, at 329.
384
U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (2001) ("'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade.") (italics added); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
4.1(a), 7.1, 8.1(a), 8.2(a), 8.4(c) (1983) (saying lawyers may be disciplined if they
lie).
385
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, enacted on
Jan. 16, 1786, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 347 (This bill was
enacted with the support of James Madison. It vindicates religious and
intellectual freedom and was one of the sources that Congress drew upon when
drafting the Bill of Rights in 1789: "[T]he truth is great and will prevail if left to
herself, [] she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to
fear from the conflict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural
weapons free argument and debate, errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is
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anyone who held different religious beliefs about God inspired the
founders to join religious freedom with the freedom of assembly
and the freedom of speech in the First Amendment.386 This
decidedly aligned the United States with the views of Roger
Williams, the founder of Rhode Island, who argued that the sword
of spirit did not hang “at the loins or side, but at the lips.”387 In fact,
the arguments of theologians like Williams may not have carried
the day against the puritans were his vision for the colonies without
free speech. In fact, the decision to keep the Church and State
separate was based on the condition that a robust freedom of speech
would be enforced, because the founders trusted the people to seek
out the truth for themselves and that if the truth was “left to herself”
she could naturally defeat lies, seditiousness and untruth. Thus, free
speech would be protected and the truth would fend for herself.
However, positivist property concepts have threatened to box in the
truth, strip her of her “natural weapons,”388 and repurpose them to
serve private and special interests.
Dishonesty, Market Failure and IP
Property law has long been deferent to the common
practices of the marketplace and society’s accepted
communications “to the universe.”389 This deference seems to turn
permitted freely to contradict them."). Cf. Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at
778 (noting that the Roman Empire recognized public property in connection
with a society's social glue, which for Rome was religion and noting that our
social glue might be free speech); Genesis 1:3 ("And God said, 'Let there be
light,' and there was light."); John 1:1, 14 ("In the beginning was the Word, and
the Word was with God, and the Word was God . . . The Word became flesh and
made his dwelling among us.").
386
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
387
Williams, supra note 297.
388
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, enacted on
January 16, 1786, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 347.
389
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805) ("If any thing, therefore, in the
digests or pandects shall appear to militate against the defendant in error, who, on
this occasion, was the foxhunter, we have only to say tempora mutantur; and if
men themselves change with the times, why should not laws also undergo an
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property cases into a yelling match.390 Courts are often ill-equipped
to make a fair determination about the specific factual
circumstances pertaining to who owns what.391 If a party gave up
possession a court may take it as evidence of a common practice
indication that party never had ownership, or abandoned
ownership.392 Thus the court may decide against, as many courts
have, the allegations of those who let go of physical possession.
Those who refuse to give away their possession, even if they are
acting against the common practice and contrary to the public
interest itself, have a much better chance of holding onto their
property.393 Often the quickest and loudest person to stake a claim
by yelling the mainstream culture’s property jargon will prevail.
alteration?"); Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 559 (D. Mass. 1872) ("The cases
cited in the argument prove a growing disposition on the part of the courts to
reject local usages when they tend to control or vary an explicit contract or a
fixed rule of law."); Heppingstone v. Mammen, 2 Haw. 707, 712 (1863)
("According to the usage which prevails among whalemen, as I understand it
from the evidence, if the ‘Richmond’ had fallen in with the whale dead, having
died of the wounds inflicted on it by the ‘Oregon's’ men the previous evening,
and the respondent had arrived and asserted his claim to it, before it was ‘cut in,’
the libellant must have given it up.").
390
Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81
(1985) ("Possession as the basis of property ownership, then, seems to amount to
something like yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested. The first to
say, 'This is mine,' in a way that the public understands, gets the prize, and the
law will help him keep it against someone else who says, 'No, it is mine.'").
391
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *406–07 (Even Blackstone
wouldn't admit there was any property in a book once it had been communicated
to the world, but for the Statute of Anne which solved his problem).
392
Compare Swift 23 F. Cas. 558 at 560 ("In this case the parties all understood
the custom, and the libellants' master yielded the whale in conformity to it.") with
Heppingstone, 2 Haw. 707 at 710, 713 ("Libellant went on board and saw the
respondent, who refused to give him half the whale, whereupon libellant left,
saying he would see about it at Honolulu . . . It seems to me, that, under all the
circumstances of the case, the whale may fairly be considered the joint prize of
both ships.").
393
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202–03 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that an
"important indicator" of copyright authorship, which is necessary for owning a
copyright, is discerning who exercised "decision-making authority" over the
creation of the work).
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In the case of the Blackstonian conception of physical
property, labor theory and utilitarianism’s phobia of inefficiency
had convinced us to essentially endure the yelling match, so to
speak, in order to avoid a tragedy of the commons.394 However, the
underlying equation that once negative externalities become large
enough that the transaction costs for creating a property rights
regime is justified cannot support all property claims as positivism
suggested it should.395 Some scholars fear that copyright and patent
is no longer creating progress in knowledge and learning as
lawmakers have seemingly abandoned a conception of a public
good underlying the grant of copyright and patent rights.396
Accordingly, they note that lawmakers have stopped considering
the social costs of granting copyright and patent rights—that these
rights actually can exclude the public from important information
and opinions. Information is something Carol Rose might call an
“inherently public good.”397 Nevertheless, copyright and patent
rights and remedies seem to have been given the color of private
property, and has accordingly been used to cast a “tragic” light on
the public interest in information.
Other sorts of public goods, like bridges, navigable
waterways, and access to public roadways tend not to be privatized
because of the ever-increasing positive externalities they create.398
This has been called an inverse “comedy” from the generally
discussed tragedy of the commons.399 Public rights in property have
394

Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
PAPERS AND PROCESS 347, 350–53 (1967).
395
Id.; Lemley, supra note 22, at n.38–42, 44, 46–47. But cf Landes & Posner,
supra note 17, at 475.
396
Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1329, 1337 (1987).
397
Rose: The Comedy, supra note 244, at 723; Sunder, supra note 129, at 262–
63 (legal scholars continue to understand IP as solely a tool to solve an economic
"public goods" problem).
398
Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 768–69; Frischmann, supra note 313,
at 931.
399
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1051 ("The result [of copying and disseminating
ideas] is that rather than a tragedy, an information commons is a ‘comedy’ in
which everyone benefits. The notion that information will be depleted by overuse
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been recognized since Roman times, and had persisted until they
were picked up again by the framers, to protect goods that consist
of a society’s “social glue.”400 What’s more is that the framers
believed that the minimization of costs to the public for access to
public goods was necessary to foster the socialization that occurs in
a healthy marketplace.401 This socialization was essential for
continued peace because “a nation of merchants would scarcely
reach for its weapons.”402 Thus, the First Amendment protection of
free speech, the freedom of assembly and the freedom of religion is
the appropriate place to house the American concept of public
goods.
In fact, the interaction of copyrights and patents with
information and free speech is inverted from the way real property
interacts with a commons. This highlights an information
common’s comedic nature. Instead of being a response to “the
allocative distortions resulting from scarcity . . . it is a conscious
decision to create scarcity in a type of good in which it is ordinarily
absent.”403 Without these rights, a public good would remain
relatively non-excludable and thus, difficult to monetize.404 Public
goods are also non-rivalrous. Thus, no matter how many times they
are used, they simply never get used up. In contrast, physical goods
like apples are rivalrous because they can only be used up once.
Thus, there is no tragedy of the commons problem solved by
copyright or patent law. Nevertheless, copyright and patent holders
have won more protection of their rights than a free market would

simply ignores basic economics."); DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE
PLUNDER OF OUR COMMON WEALTH 37 (2003) (reverse to "comedy" or
"cornucopia" or "inverse" commons that occurs with non-depletable
information); Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 768–69.
400
Rose: The Comedy, supra note 292, at 777–78.
401
Id.
402
Id. n.300, 301.
403
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1055.
404
See generally Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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protect scarce physical property.405 It follows that today’s copyright
and patent rights are too robust.406
Part of the reason why is that copyright and patent rights are
being conceived of as private property. The term “intellectual
property” itself may have fueled this shift, a term which became a
common descriptor in the field when the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) was established.407 It seems that
international interests and a broad concept of property have gone
hand in hand. WIPO and TRIPs have thus continued to buttress our
acceptance of Patent, Copyright, Trademark, Trade Secret and
Publicity Rights as a collective “Intellectual Property” field. The
Ginsberg dissent in Kirtsaeng argued that U.S. supported TRIPs
agreements strengthened international copyright to a point where it

405

Lemley, supra note 22, at 1055.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant
is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved."); Festo Corp.
v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) ("[P]atent
rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public."); W.L.
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (1983) ("Early public
disclosure is a linchpin in the [patent] system."); Lemley, supra note 22, at 1052
("[T]here is no general reason to worry about uncompensated positive
externalities. Indeed, part of the point of intellectual property law is to promote
uncompensated positive externalities, by ensuring that ideas and works that might
otherwise be kept secret are widely disseminated."); Bell, supra note 371, at 231
("[C]opyright focuses on generating positive externalities . . . [C]opyright
concentrates on increasing the public good afforded by expressive works.");
Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) (“[T]he more works that are disseminated, the more
[copyright's] goal is advanced.").
407
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1034 (At the very least, the rise of using the term
"intellectual property" coincided with the rise of the "property rights" view of IP.
Prior to the 1960's, the term “intellectual property” also showed up in European
literature) (citing A. NION, DROIT CIVILS DES AUTEURS, Artistes ET Inventeurs
(1846) (referring to "proriete intellectuelle.")); WIPO Convention Establishing
the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, art. 2 (viii), 6 I. L.
M. 782, 784 (WIPO defined intellectual property as including "rights resulting
from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields.").
406
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overpowered common law alienation rights to physical property.408
The majority relied on the Constitution and common law to arrive
at a much more reasonable solution that did not draw upon an
“intellectual property” rationale.409
The Kirtsaeng majority’s reliance on a constitutional
foundation and reluctance to apply property jurisprudence was
proper. It was proper because it sought to define copyrights by the
grant of power by which they were created. In the United States,
copyrights were not created through common law property
principles, and in fact they are not meant to interfere with the legal
alienation of tangible property. Similarly, all intangible property
claims should be tested in court to make sure they fit within the
bounds of the law that granted them.
In the age of information, when intangibles from digital
currencies to a business’s goodwill are being traded on the open
market globally, courts need a test to guarantee the honest creation,
allocation and valuation of these “items.”410 These intangibles
cannot be inspected because they are not detectable by our senses.
In fact, intangibles can only be comprehended as placeholders for
something else, like physical property or other valuable backing.
Thus, the lack of a sufficient nexus with a physical thing should
indicate that there is no property right in the intangible in question.

408

Kirtsaeng, No. 11–697, slip op. at 33 ("Moreover, the exhaustion regime the
dissent apparently favors would provide that 'the sale in one country of a good'
does not 'exhaus[t] the intellectual-property owner’s right to control the
distribution of that good elsewhere.'").
409
Id.
410
See, e.g., Elizabeth Hester & Erik Holm, Citigroup to Sell Umbrella Logo to
St. Paul Travelers (Update 7), BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 13, 2007, 6:44 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aAsp4RJRDG7w
(After a series of corporate purchases and sales Citibank found that a TM that is
extremely valuable to Travelers was not valuable to Citi which should raise
questions about the ‘value’ of these items, and to what extent intangibles can be
conceived of as ‘items’: "The biggest U.S. bank plans to sell its red umbrella
trademark to St. Paul Travelers Cos. and operate under the ‘Citi’ name after
failing to get most consumers to think of anything except insurance when they
saw the 137-year-old symbol.").
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De-cloaking intangibles with no actual “thing” backing up
its value will create a more stable market. The public, main street
America and the marketplace itself can no longer abide dishonest or
reckless property claims in intangibles. Furthermore, the blanket
recognition of the movement of intangibles over state lines to
justify expansive federal regulation violates the co-existence of the
grants of legislative power, and federalism. Entertaining regulation
based on intangible movement creates undue pressure on the
judiciary to explain how intangibles move or exist relative to state
geography. In fact, it would be easier for a court to describe the
movements of God.411 The impossibility of describing how nonthings move is why we have “arising under” jurisdiction through a
separate grant of constitutional power for copyright and patent laws.
Nothing would be rejected by the popular mind so quickly as how
the movement of a non-thing intangible allows long arm federal
regulation that interferes with the interests of most Americans. This
was most clearly seen when public outcry shut down SOPA, PIPA
and ACTA.
Thus, judicial forbearance requires the Supreme Court to
continue its revision of Constitutional interpretation. Affirming a
free-riding problem and an expansive view of medical licenses as
carrying with them property rights will not do. Allowing the
Commerce Clause to continue facilitating the circumvention of the
limits of the other grants of legislative power cannot continue. The
Court needs to adopt an honest and truthful approach to intangible
property that reasonably limits its endorsement of highly political
issues best left to other branches. This should include a closer eye
on the honest creation, allocation and valuation of intangible
property rights.

411

Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2589 (The Framers "were 'practical statesmen' and not
metaphysical philosophers."). See, e.g., Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 619
(1879) ("The right to use the trade-mark is not limited to any place, city, or State,
and, therefore, must be deemed to extend everywhere.").
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Honesty as a Procedural Formality
Formalism was generally abandoned when the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted stating, “there is but one
form of action, the civil action.”412 Thus, as long as a plaintiff was
able to plead in their facts a cause of action a court could hear their
case, no matter the form in which the facts were pled. A result of
the shift away from formalism has been that the courts no longer are
able to develop new causes of action through formalistic
“evolution.”413 Nevertheless, those causes of action that existed
when the forms were closed still must be pled, even if informally.
In this way “the forms of action . . . still rule us from their
graves.”414 Even so, it was seen as a step forward to cast off
formalism and allow parties to move U.S. Courts as long as a
colorable action had been pled in whatever form.415 This practice
purportedly removed almost any formalistic requirement on a court
to discuss whether the form of action brought was proper. It is
precisely because formality has been abandoned that spectators
have been able to claim “contract is the new copyright”416 and that
EULA’s are “the new millennium’s founding social contract.”417
412

FED. R. CIV. P. 2.; Cf. BAKER, supra note 12, at 60 ("redistribution of so
much of the law under one 'form' [trespass on the case] introduced a good
measure of procedural uniformity" which eventually facilitated the abolishment
of the legal forms in England).
413
BAKER, supra note 12, at 58–60, 264, 303 ("Most of the law as we know it
was shaped by this process. Trespass on the case brought new areas of
jurisdiction to the royal courts, such as defamation; it filled gaps in the praecipe
actions, by enabling damages to be awarded for breach of parol contracts, for past
nuisances, and for conversion of goods; and finally it enabled the praecipe
actions themselves to be replaced."); FIFOOT, supra note 382, at 77.
414
BAKER, supra note 12, at 61 (quoting Young v. Queensland Trustees 99 CLR
560(1956) (Eng)).
415
FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (only requiring pleadings to contain a short and plain
statement of the claim). But see Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018
(9th Cir. 2001) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) that claims of fraud must be plead
with particularity to dismiss a claim for lack of particularity in the pleading).
416
Lydia Pallas Loren, Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School, Classroom
Lecture on Copyright and Contract (Mar. 20, 2012). See also Marshall v. New
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Conversely, Ichbal and Twombly arguably have re-adopted a
formalism in Federal Courts that could straighten out these
confusions.418 Where once a plaintiff needed only to plead the
elements of a cause of action that were possible, the Supreme Court
has increased the formality required by dismissing claims that are
not “plausible” on the facts. As the Supreme Court explained,
plausibility lies somewhere between possibility and probability.
Similarly, minimum formalistic safeguards should be instituted so
that dishonest creation, allocation and valuation of intangible
property is not de facto underwritten by the general informality of
today’s age.419 Requiring truthful claims of intangible property
would be so small a burden for the Court and so central to its
project of administering justice under rule 1 that it could fit under
the plausibility standard put forth in Ichbal and Twombly without
rising to the type of formalism ousted by rules 2 and 8.420 The
Kids On The Block P'ship, 780 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The line
between cases that 'arise under' the copyright laws, as contemplated by § 1338(a),
and those that present only state law contract issues, is a very subtle one and the
question leads down 'one of the darkest corridors of the law of federal courts and
federal jurisdiction.'") (quoting Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895
F.2d 967, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1990)); Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License: An
Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 275, 294 (2009) ("There is a need for developing a non-contractual
new standard in copyright law, rather that the proposed development of the
implied license doctrine would not be a total deviation from legal
fundamentals.").
417
Fairfield, supra note 123, at 44.
418
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (This was a criminal case that
seems to require a formal standard that a cause of action be pled plausibly on its
face. This is more than mere possibility); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 546 (2007) (This was a civil case that also heightened formal standards to
"plausible" from possible on its face); FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
419
See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Arcane Market is Next to Face Big Credit
Test, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
02/17/business/17swap.html?ref=creditdefaultswaps&_r=0 (Credit default swaps,
for instance, could be cabined away from the institution of property when being
reviewed in court by formalistically deciding they are purely an animal of
contract law).
420
FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 2, 8.
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heightened pleading requirements in Rule 9(b) requiring
“particularity” in certain circumstances had not seemed to run afoul
our preference of informal procedure.421 Perjury laws, designed to
ensure the truthfulness of a Court’s findings, could also harbor a
procedural enquiry as to an intangible’s honest creation, marketing
and valuation.422 The definition of “good faith,” including “honesty
in fact” under the Universal Commercial Code and rules 4.1, 7.1
and 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct also support
such a simple and virtually costless prophylactic formality.423
Honesty as a formal requirement is minimalist by nature,
and would quickly ferret out cases on the outset that were not
properly brought. This is so because the truth is necessary for
carrying out the administration of justice and without it half-truths
and lies will slow down the judicial process.424 If someone claims to
have acquired some newfangled property right, they should be
obliged to explain on the outset of a case how this right was created,
who owns it, and the basis of its worth or value. Once this is
established to the court’s satisfaction they would be allowed to
proceed under a theory of property. If a party failed to satisfy a
court’s inquiry into the honesty of their property claims, any claim
under a property theory should be dismissed. The tradition of
discussing whether a proper claim had been brought was long
practiced in English Courts as a matter of procedure.
Take for instance The Shepherd’s Case, heard in 1486 by an
English court.425 A writ of trespass on the case was brought against
a negligent shepherd that let 100 sheep drown of which he was
entrusted to watch. Before the case could be heard, the judges had
to discuss whether an “action sur le cas lie[d]” or whether it was
421

FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
18 U.S.C. § 1621.
423
U.C.C. § 2-103(b); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a), 7.1, 8.1(a),
8.2(a), 8.4(c) (1983). See also BAKER, supra note 12, at 306 (noting that actions
on the case inspired statutes of frauds to ensure more honesty in contracting for
property).
424
18 U.S.C. § 1621.
425
The Shepherd's Case Y.B. 2 Hen.7, Hil. f. 11, pl. 9 in FIFOOT, supra note 382,
at 86–87.
422
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more appropriately an “action of Covenant.”426 Unfortunately,
modern judges have been stripped of this tool to parse between
whether a case was properly brought under contract or property.
Thus, intangible property claims have been allowed to give cases
the color of legitimacy without question. In this way copyright has
been used to infuse contracts with heavy remedies that contract law
was not made to carry.427
The form of action called “trespass on the case”428 was
adopted into American common law most famously in Pierson v.
Post.429 According to a required formality, the court considered
how a property right in a wild animal may be properly claimed.430
Similarly, courts should require an explanation as to how property
rights are created in intangibles. The forms were not federally
abandoned until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938.431 The states that had not yet abolished the
forms of action in 1938 eventually followed suit and today the
forms of action have been closed in every U.S. jurisdiction as a
matter of procedure. Nonetheless, in property law actual possession
continues to be the rule for claiming property in ferae naturae and
similar cases, as the Second Circuit has found that the application of
a foreign sovereign’s patrimony laws required that they had actually
exercised a possessory interest in the items being claimed.432 Thus,
abandonment of the forms has only limited the Court’s prerogative
426

Id.
See Afori, supra note 416, at 294.
428
BAKER, supra note 12, at 59 ("The nature of the distinction [between trespass
and case] was arbitrary and difficult to appreciate. Eighteenth-century
rationalisation made the test one of directness: 'in trespass the plaintiff complains
of an immediate wrong, and in case of a wrong that is the consequence of another
act.' An action of trespass for fixing a spout so that it directed rainwater onto the
plaintiff's house was therefore struck down by the King's Bench on the ground
that the proper action was case.").
429
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
430
Id.
431
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
432
United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 405 (2d Cir. 2003) (deciding that
Egypt had to have taken possessory interest over the artifacts to claim them under
its patrimony law—this is the same as the old rules for hunting wild animals).
427
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to reconsider established rules of law.433 It has not, however,
limited the rules that were once established by the formal practices
of our history or their formal application to the facts.
The closing of the forms of action purportedly took law
reform out of judicial review.434 Accordingly, legal scholars have
cited numerus clausus435 and announced that we should not fear an
expansion of legally accepted property rights, despite the rise of
positivism. Property rights in intangibles and the positivist
movement would be a limited one, by this very principle. However,
the result seems to have been quite the opposite. Positivism is the
legal norm, and property rights in intangibles are being claimed
with a renewed fervor. And now, without the help of an open ended
formality like trespass on the case—which formally allowed a court
to consider for example how a property right is created in wild
animals—courts may be unable to review whether an intangible
property claim has been properly brought. Requiring honesty in
intangible property creation, allocation and valuation will take at
the least, a minimum amount of formalism in requiring plaintiffs to
plead “honest” property claims, or to call out dishonest property
claims. Disputes like the one in Pierson v. Post about the nature of
property rights in a wild fox should be heard in court regarding
intangibles. Otherwise, the nature of intangibles will be decided by
old rules that do not fit and the information age will continue to
binge on the over-allocation, over-creation and over-valuation of
intangibles.
CONCLUSION: APPLYING THE TRUTH TO

433

BAKER, supra note 12, at 61 ("[T]he posthumous rule of the forms of action
has tended towards a tyranny which in life they were never permitted. The
categories of legal thought were closed in 1832 [in England], and where once the
law might have developed through the recognition of new writs it is now left at
the mercy of commissions and an overworked parliament. Law reform is no
longer subject to judicial review [in England].").
434
Id.
435
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (2000) ("The
numerus clausus is probably at its weakest in the area of intellectual property.").
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INTANGIBLES
The concept of property envisioned by the framers and
embodied in our constitution was necessarily physical property.
Thus the Constitutional provisions that protect our property and
security need not usher in a positivist conception of property
without a heightened scrutiny standard that requires some
connection to physical property. A standard of honesty seems up to
the job and should be applied to intangibles by the Court before it
allocates the color of property. The Court seems an ideal place to
adjudicate the truth of a matter and it should not shy away from its
duty to do so.
The effects of this policy on markets for physical property,
intangibles valued accurately by real property backing and honest
business practices will be minimal to none. Only dishonest practices
that pull value out of nowhere, or that depend on the winds of
chance for payout, will be removed from the property regime. They
may continue to subsist under contract law provided they do not
untruthfully hold themselves out to be trading in a form of property.
But they will no longer get the implicit approval conferred by the
attribution of property through the judicial branch.
It may seem subtle at first, but the de-cloaking of dishonest
creation, valuation, and allocation of intangible property rights will
make them much less mobile. Contracts that include intangibles that
are not cloaked in property would not be subject to buyer’s
remorse.436 Instead they would be subjected to contract law’s good
faith and fair dealing requirements.437 The result if a violation is
found would be to set the parties back to their original position had
the contract been fair and honest. This would be much more
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Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 577, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (1887); Wood v.
Boynton, 64 Wis. 265, 25 N.W. 42, 44 (1885).
437
U.C.C. § 2-103(b) ("'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade.") (emphasis added).
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desirable than the current default of buyer and seller’s remorse
regarding intangible property transfers.438
Such a policy would preserve the judiciary and the
credibility of the U.S. government in general. Imbuing intangibles
with the attribute of property is risky because it implies judicial
approval of market practices. The members of the other branches of
government cannot expect to underwrite too many liars and
scandals without risking peaceful overthrow by their constituents
during election time. The politics involved therein demand that the
judiciary settle a safe distance from the fray.
Furthermore, our continued credibility on the world’s stage
depends on a closer eye on marketplace honesty and fairness. All
cultures and all nations recognize lying as an undesirable if not
outright unacceptable character trait in a business partner. The
current trend of underwriting property regimes that aid American
corporations in the non-truthful creation, valuation, and allocation
of intangible property is a sure way to destroy our credibility on the
international market.
The Supreme Court and all lawmakers should continue to
recognize information as an inherently public good, and freedom
and equality as a baseline for the future of IP regulation and
regulation of intangible property in general. In order to achieve this,
the Court should adopt a conception of honesty in creation,
allocation and valuation of intangible property. Reclaiming a
principle of honesty will ensure that market failures are staved off
and will protect a continued growth to the American economy and
the middle class. Furthermore it will safeguard American business
abroad from being branded dishonest and thus not trusted. Whether
we see Jay Gatsby or Robin Hood as a greater evil is irrelevant.
Everyone, including the founders and framers of the U.S.
Constitution,439 has agreed that dishonesty is disfavored, destructive
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Hunt, supra note 31, at 713 ("Fraud inevitably increases during a bubble."),
and at 743 (describing ways a court can rescind "bubble contracts.").
439
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It is a rule not enjoined
upon the courts by legislative provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant
to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the
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and an obstruction to the administration of justice. Thus, subjecting
claims of intangible property to a standard of honesty as a matter of
formal procedure in court is in the best interest of everyone.

law."), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_78.html. See also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) ("In the course of the preceding
observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your
guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a
matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than
those which may result from the evidence of truth.") available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_01.html; THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John
Jay) ("Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this
change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would
not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being
fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.") available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_02.html; THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James
Madison) ("The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public
councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular
governments have everywhere perished.") available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/histdox/fed_10.html; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The
perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the
great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. And the
unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which have been in various
ways practiced to keep the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to
demand the reprobation of all honest men.") available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/histdox/fed_85.html.

